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ARE TWO MINORITIES EQUAL TO ONE?:
MINORITY COALITION GROUPS AND SECTION 2
OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Kevin Sette*
Following Jim Crow, vote dilution is the second-generation barrier
standing between minority voters and the polls. Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) protects racial and language minorities from these
vote dilution practices. To sustain a section 2 claim, a protected “class of
citizens” must satisfy the criteria laid out by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Thornburg v. Gingles. First, the class must constitute the majority of a
hypothetical single-member voting district. Second, the class must be
politically cohesive. Third, the minority class’s preferred candidate must be
defeated by a white majority voting bloc.
What the Supreme Court has yet to answer is whether members of more
than one minority group may form a single “class” to sustain a claim under
Gingles and the VRA. In the Court’s silence, the federal circuits have
diverged on the answer to this question. This Note examines the developing
circuit split and proposes that the Supreme Court recognize protection of
minority coalitions under the VRA. Principles of statutory interpretation
require prudent courts to recognize that minority aggregation is
contemplated by section 2. Further, the existing Gingles framework is
readily equipped to prevent noncohesive groups from abusing section 2 for
unfair political advantage.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider Marques County, a fictional county located in a state consisting
of both urban and suburban areas.1 There are three single-member voting
districts2 within Marques County—District 1, District 2, and District 3. All
three districts, prior to 2010 and now, are roughly equal in population size.
Before 2010, Marques County’s only urban region fell entirely within
District 1. Most of the county’s minority population resides in this urban
area. The voting population of District 1 was, prior to 2010, 49 percent
Hispanic or Black and 45 percent white. Districts 2 and 3 are entirely
suburban and predominantly white. Elections in Marques County are
1. This hypothetical, using facts similar to those of real cases, serves as an example of
vote dilution in a single-member voting district involving multiple minority groups.
2. A single-member voting district is one in which the electorate of each district elects
only one candidate. Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1384 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996).
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typically voted along racial lines, with Hispanics and Blacks consistently
voting for the same candidates. As a result, a minority-preferred candidate
has historically represented District 1, and white-preferred candidates have
historically represented Districts 2 and 3.
Following the 2010 Census, the state legislature redrew its voting districts,
including those in Marques County. The three districts were redrawn so that
Marques County’s urban region is now divided equally among Districts 1, 2,
and 3. The result is a redistribution of racial and ethnic diversity within each
district. Whereas the combined population of Hispanics and Blacks once
constituted a predominant majority in District 1, each of Marques County’s
three single-member voting districts now has a white majority. Since
redistricting took place, no minority-preferred candidate has won an election
in Marques County.
Hispanic and Black plaintiffs file a complaint in federal court claiming that
their votes in Marques County are being diluted in violation of the federal
Voting Rights Act of 19653 (VRA).4 Vote dilution is a process by which an
electoral system “diminish[es] the overall impact of the minority vote.”5
Since 1965, the VRA has banned vote dilution of racial minorities and,
following an amendment in 1975, has done the same for language
minorities.6 The plaintiffs argue that the legislature diluted the power of their
votes because, despite no change in the actual population of Marques County,
redistricting has eliminated their ability to elect legislators of their choice.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the VRA in Thornburg v.
Gingles7 established three criteria that a protected “class of citizens”8 must
show to successfully sustain a claim of vote dilution.9 First, the minority
group must be sufficiently large and compact to constitute the majority of a
theoretical single-member voting district.10 Second, the minority group must
be politically cohesive.11 Third, the white majority must vote as a bloc to
defeat minority-preferred candidates.12 The Supreme Court, however, has
failed to identify whether a “class of citizens” protected under the VRA may
3. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
52 U.S.C.).
4. This hypothetical action is the first procedural step for real-life litigants pursuing a
vote dilution claim under the VRA on a minority coalition theory.
5. Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Herbert, A General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA
L.J. 1, 4 (1993).
6. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018); Rick G. Strange, Application of Voting Rights Act
to Communities Containing Two or More Minority Groups—When Is the Whole Greater Than
the Sum of the Parts?, 20 TEX. TECH L. REV. 95, 104 (1989) (“[S]ection 2 provides that
minority votes are not to be diluted by any voting scheme or structure.”); About Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/about-section-5-votingrights-act [https://perma.cc/Q3HC-WR3G] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also infra notes
64–65 and accompanying text (defining “language minorities” under the VRA).
7. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
8. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b).
9. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50–51.
10. Id. at 50.
11. Id. at 51.
12. Id.
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contain members of more than one minority group.13 Stated differently, may
the Hispanic and Black plaintiffs of Marques County aggregate14 to bring a
unified claim of vote dilution or must they sustain claims as two different
classes?
Federal circuit courts have diverged on the answer to this question for
years.15 Initially, the federal circuits unanimously accepted the notion that
multiple minority groups may create a single class under the VRA.16 In
Campos v. City of Baytown,17 for example, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
nothing in the text or history of the VRA prevented Blacks and Hispanics
from alleging a single vote dilution claim together.18 Almost ten years later,
the Sixth Circuit became the first to take the opposite position.19 In Nixon v.
Kent County,20 a divided Sixth Circuit concluded en banc that the VRA’s text
did not support a finding that aggregated minority groups were a protected
class.21 Following Nixon, a split developed in the circuit courts, which has
gone unaddressed by the Supreme Court and Congress for over three
decades.22
Scholars have taken up the challenge and are similarly at odds.23 Critics
of minority aggregation contend that the VRA was not intended to protect
13. See Lauren R. Weinberg, Note, Reading the Tea Leaves: The Supreme Court and the
Future of Coalition Districts Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 91 WASH. U. L. REV.
411, 413 (2013) (noting that the Supreme Court has never addressed the minority aggregation
issue directly); see also Audrey Yang, Note, Treading Carefully After Shelby County:
Minority Coalitions Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 701, 702
(explaining that federal circuits are split on Congress’s intent regarding minority aggregation).
14. The phrases “minority coalition” and “minority aggregation” are used interchangeably
throughout this Note. The general idea is “the ability to join our votes with like-minded others
to elect our preferred candidates.” See Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE L.J.
FORUM 761, 764 (2018); see also Michael S. Taintor, Note, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
Special Circumstances, and Evidence of Equality, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1767, 1775 (2019).
15. Compare League of United Latin Am. Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland Indep.
Sch. Dist. (LULAC I), 812 F.2d 1494, 1500–02 (5th Cir. 1987) (accepting minority coalition
claims), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.
1987), and Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cty. v. Hardee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524,
526 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), and Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of
Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1994) (same), with Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381,
1388 (6th Cir. 1996) (rejecting coalition claims as beyond the VRA’s scope).
16. In 1996, the Sixth Circuit was the first court to reject minority aggregation at the
federal appellate level. See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1388. At that point, other circuits had
contemplated and accepted aggregation for at least nine years. See supra note 15.
17. 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988).
18. Id. at 1244.
19. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
20. 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
21. Id. at 1388.
22. See infra Part II (outlining the circuit split that has developed across the federal circuit
courts that have addressed the coalition claim question).
23. Compare Dale E. Ho, Two Fs for Formalism: Interpreting Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act in Light of Changing Demographics and Electoral Patterns, 50 HARV. C. R.-C. L.
L. REV. 403 (2015), and Sara Michaloski, Note, A Tale of Two Minority Groups: Can Two
Different Minority Groups Bring a Coalition Suit Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 271 (2014), with Sebastian Geraci, Note, The Case Against
Allowing Multiracial Coalitions to File Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 389,
Christopher E. Skinnell, Note, Why Courts Should Forbid Minority Coalition Plaintiffs Under
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political groups.24 They argue that, by congregating, the minority plaintiffs
in Marques County would be abusing VRA protections to further mutual
political interests.25 Critics assert that multiple minority groups together
could not constitute a single “class of citizens” protected in the VRA’s text.26
In contrast, supporters of coalition groups argue that the VRA should be
interpreted broadly to provide the greatest degree of protection possible.27
Such supporters affirmatively dispute the contention that coalition groups
would be able to abuse VRA protection for political gain.28 Like claims
asserted by a single minority group, claims by multiple minorities would still
have to satisfy the burdens established in Gingles.29 As such, the Marques
County plaintiffs would still have to prove, at a minimum, that they constitute
the majority of a potential district (for example, District 1 prior to 2010),
cohesively vote for the same candidates, and their candidate was defeated by
a white voting bloc.30
A lack of clarity about minority coalition rights creates practical concerns.
America’s white population is declining as Hispanic, Black, and Asian
populations rise in certain regions of the country.31 Between 2000 and 2018,
over one hundred counties witnessed white populations drop below 50
percent of the total population in each county.32 Almost three hundred
counties total “were majority nonwhite in 2018,”33 including twenty-one of
the nation’s twenty-five most populous counties.34 Translated to the voting
context, nonwhites will represent a record one-third of all eligible voters in
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Absent Clear Congressional Authorization, 2002 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 363, and Yang, supra note 13.
24. See Geraci, supra note 23, at 393 (“The VRA was not designed to cater to interestgroup politics.”); Skinnell, supra note 23, at 365 (“[A]ggregation would be a radical departure
from the VRA’s purpose of ending racial discrimination, making it a mere tool of political
interests.”). Drawing this distinction will be all the more important now that the Supreme
Court has decided that partisan gerrymandering claims pose a political question beyond the
reach of federal courts. See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019).
25. See Geraci, supra note 23, at 393 (arguing that the VRA’s purpose was to end
discrimination and not to give coalition groups power they otherwise would not have).
26. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 13, at 716 (contending that use of the singular “class” in
the VRA’s text prevents inclusion of multiminority coalitions).
27. See Ho, supra note 23, at 431–32 n.167; Michaloski, supra note 23, at 293.
28. See Michaloski, supra note 23, at 294.
29. See id.; see also supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
30. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
31. Jens Manuel Krogstad, Reflecting a Demographic Shift, 109 U.S. Counties Have
Become Majority Nonwhite Since 2000, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Aug. 21, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/08/21/u-s-counties-majority-nonwhite/
[https://perma.cc/85B2-3WEN]. For example, in 2018, the Hispanic population in the United
States reached 59.9 million, an increase of 1.2 million from the previous year. Antonio Flores
et al., U.S. Hispanic Population Reached New High in 2018, but Growth Has Slowed, PEW
RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (July 8, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/08/us-hispanic-population-reached-new-high-in-2018-but-growth-has-slowed/ [https://perma.cc/
75YH-H29G].
32. Krogstad, supra note 31.
33. Id.
34. Id. (“In 21 of the 25 biggest U.S. counties by population, nonwhite groups together
make up more than half of residents.”).
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the 2020 presidential election.35 As a result of these trends, the impending
2020 Census will task state legislatures with redrawing voting districts
around an unprecedented number of nonwhite municipalities. The likely
aftermath will be a wave of litigation by minority groups, both individually
and in the aggregate, alleging dilution of their voting rights—especially in
regions already accused of engaging in minority voter suppression.36 To
properly address these claims, there must be uniformity in how courts
interpret the legal responsibilities imposed on state legislatures regarding
minority coalition voting.
This Note addresses the current ambiguity surrounding the legal rights of
minority coalitions. The majority37 circuit court approach permits minority
coalitions to bring vote dilution claims, relying on congressional intent and
broad statutory interpretation for support.38 This includes a handful of
circuits that accept minority aggregation without even addressing the issue.39
The minority40 circuit court approach interprets the VRA narrowly to require
that a single “class of citizens” be composed of members of a single minority
group.41 Scholars tried to resolve this disagreement but have provided
meritorious arguments on both sides.42 The circuit split ultimately leaves
state legislatures uncertain about their legal obligations and gives minority
groups varying degrees of protection depending on where in the country their
rights are being violated.

35. Anthony Cilluffo & Richard Fry, An Early Look at the 2020 Electorate, PEW RES.
CTR.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/
essay/an-early-look-at-the-2020-electorate/ [https://perma.cc/Y3DF-MMDK].
36. See Jason Lemon, Hours-Long Super Tuesday Voting Lines in Texas County Lead to
Accusations of ‘Voter Suppression,’ NEWSWEEK (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/
hours-long-super-tuesday-voting-lines-texas-county-lead-accusations-voter-suppression1490560 [https://perma.cc/ZN98-7HCR]; Wendy R. Weiser, This Is the Worst Voter
Suppression We’ve Seen in the Modern Era, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/worst-voter-suppression-weveseen-modern-era [https://perma.cc/EAU2-Z3XN] (“There’s evidence that states in which the
political clout of minorities is growing—where the ruling majority perceives a threat to its
power—are more likely to see restrictive voting laws than are more demographically
homogenous states. And as the salience of race in our politics has increased, so too has voter
suppression.”). These fears have only been exacerbated by the effects of the coronavirus
pandemic on voting. See Alex Isenstadt, Trump Campaign Declares War on Dems Over
Voting Rules for November, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/
2020/04/03/trump-2020-election-legal-battle-coronavirus-162152 [https://perma.cc/QQ8S4TRD] (citing the surge in voting-related litigation likely to commence following elections
impacted by the pandemic).
37. See Yang, supra note 13, at 702 (identifying permission of minority aggregation as
the majority view among the circuits).
38. See infra Part II.A (identifying courts of appeals that have explicitly assented to
coalition claims).
39. See infra Part II.B (identifying courts of appeals that have implicitly assented to
coalition claims).
40. See Yang, supra note 13, at 702.
41. See infra Part II.C (identifying courts of appeals that have rejected coalition claims).
42. See infra Parts II.A.3, II.C.3 (identifying, respectively, scholarly support for and
criticism of minority aggregation under the VRA).
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Part I of this Note provides background information on the enactment and
development of the VRA, as well as a general history of minority voting
rights in the United States. This Note reviews seminal Supreme Court cases
that interpret, expand, and limit the VRA’s powers and applicability.
Part II analyzes the current split among both the federal courts of appeals
and scholars over whether the VRA permits aggregated minority groups to
sustain vote dilution claims. This Note divides the federal circuits into three
distinct groups: (1) those that have explicitly granted VRA protections to
minority coalitions, (2) those that have assumed the validity of such
protections, and (3) those that have explicitly denied or are likely to deny
extension of the VRA to aggregated minority claims.
Part III argues that both the VRA’s text and Congress’s intent support
allowing minority coalition claims. This Note asserts that applying common
tools of statutory interpretation to the VRA requires prudent courts to
recognize that members of different minority groups can form a single “class
of citizens.” Finally, this Note concludes by disputing common criticisms of
minority aggregation, including the popular belief that coalitions will abuse
the VRA for unfair political advantage.
I. THE VRA AND MINORITY VOTING POWER
A. History of the VRA
The tempestuous journey of recognizing minority voting rights in the
United States started with the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in
1870.43 The Fifteenth Amendment declares that the right to vote may not be
“denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.”44 In its aftermath, measures were taken across the country to
resist this constitutional constraint and circumvent minority access to the
franchise.45 The Supreme Court seemed to have constructively rendered the
Fifteenth Amendment moot in 1898 when it upheld one of these measures:
a Mississippi poll tax designed to deny Blacks the right to vote.46 This
decision catalyzed enactment of similar legislation across the South.47 These
43. See Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement
of Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 732–33 (1998); see also U.S. CONST. amend.
XV.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
45. See Hench, supra note 43, at 733–36. At the time, these legal measures included
“whites-only” primaries, poll taxes, and literacy tests. Id.
46. See Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 222 (1898) (finding that a Mississippi law
requiring payment of taxes in order to vote did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Congress was no better. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One
v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009) (“The first century of congressional enforcement of the
[Fifteenth] Amendment . . . can only be regarded as a failure.”).
47. A Brief History of Jim Crow, CONST. RTS. FOUND., https://www.crf-usa.org/blackhistory-month/a-brief-history-of-jim-crow [https://perma.cc/CKB3-YYJ4] (last visited Apr.
12, 2020) (“Given the green light, Southern states began to limit the voting right to those who
owned property or could read well, to those whose grandfathers had been able to vote, to those
with ‘good characters,’ to those who paid poll taxes.”).
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“first-generation”48 methods of voter suppression persisted well into the
twentieth century,49 until Congress and the federal courts eventually phased
them out.50 States soon thereafter adopted newer and more complex
“second-generation” methods of disenfranchisement in the form of strategic
redistricting and vote dilution.51 In response to these evolving practices,
Congress passed the VRA52 to vigorously reinforce each citizen’s
constitutional voting rights, “including the right to . . . cast meaningful
votes.”53 The VRA is not permanent legislation but instead survives by
Congress’s periodic extension of the law.54 Most recently, the VRA was
extended in 2006 for a period of twenty-five years.55
There are two primary provisions of the VRA: section 2 and section 5.56
Section 5 prohibits changes in the election practices of certain jurisdictions,
specifically those having a greater likelihood of promoting voter
disenfranchisement, until such changes have passed administrative review by
the attorney general or U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.57
However, the Supreme Court’s 2013 ruling in Shelby County v. Holder58
declared unconstitutional section 5’s selection criteria.59 While not found
unconstitutional itself, section 5 is all but unusable after Shelby County.60
48. Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV.
1663, 1671 (2001) (classifying legal remedies to “first-generation” methods, primarily the
Fifteenth Amendment, as “first-generation” voting rights).
49. Id.
50. See Kelly Phillips Erb, For Election Day, a History of the Poll Tax in America, FORBES
(Nov. 5, 2018, 8:30 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyphillipserb/2018/11/05/justbefore-the-elections-a-history-of-the-poll-tax-in-america
[https://perma.cc/Y9VG-DRTB]
(describing the systematic rejection of Jim Crow laws, including the poll tax, via the TwentyFourth Amendment, VRA, and Supreme Court precedent).
51. See Chelsea J. Hopkins, Note, The Minority Coalition’s Burden of Proof Under
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 623, 626 n.18 (2012); see also
Gerken, supra note 48, at 1666.
52. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
52 U.S.C.).
53. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 note (2018) (stating Congress’s purpose and findings in enacting
the VRA).
54. See History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://
www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/S3B4-W432] (last
visited Apr. 12, 2020).
55. Carl Hulse, By a Vote of 98-0, Senate Approves 25-Year Extension of Voting Rights
Act, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/washington/
21vote.html [https://perma.cc/3PWZ-QM6Y].
56. Hopkins, supra note 51, at 626.
57. See 52 U.S.C. § 10303(a)–(b); About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 6.
58. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
59. Id. at 553–54 (finding that Congress’s renewal of section 5 criteria was
unconstitutional because “Congress did not . . . shape [an updated] coverage formula
grounded in current conditions”).
60. See About Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 6. The Supreme Court’s
gutting of section 5 resulted in a wave of discriminatory voting practices. See Kristen Clarke
& Ezra Rosenberg, Opinion, Trump Administration Has Voting Rights Act on Life Support,
CNN (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/06/opinions/voting-rights-actanniversary-long-way-to-go-clarke-rosenberg-opinion/index.html [https://perma.cc/47DQTD9K] (“After Shelby, a myriad of discriminatory voting practices have been implemented
both in jurisdictions previously covered by Section 5 and those that were not.”); Anagha
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Unlike other provisions of the VRA, section 2 applies to all U.S.
jurisdictions and remains practicably enforceable.61 At its creation, section
2 banned any state62 “standard, practice, or procedure” that denied or
abridged a citizen’s right to vote “on account of race or color.”63 Section 2
was subsequently amended in 1975 to extend these protections to “language
minority group[s].”64 This amendment specifically protects American
Indians, Asian Americans, Alaskan Natives, and persons of Spanish
heritage.65 Section 2 is violated where, based on a totality of the
circumstances, “members of a [protected] class of citizens” have less
opportunity to “participate in the political process and elect representatives
of their choice.”66
Srikanth, Long Voting Lines in Texas Renew Accusations of Voter Suppression, HILL (Mar. 4,
2020), https://thehill.com/changing-america/respect/diversity-inclusion/485906-long-votinglines-in-texas-renew-accusations-of [https://perma.cc/RLJ2-EGEP] (identifying that Texas
alone has closed 750 polling stations since 2012); Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court May
Soon Deal a Final, Fatal Blow to the Voting Rights Act, SLATE (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/10/supreme-court-voting-rights-actobliteration.html [https://perma.cc/ZPZ2-4LHB] (stating that, following Shelby County, states
have closed over 1600 polling places and enacted discriminatory voter ID laws). In February
2019, companion legislation was introduced in both houses of Congress, which intended to
revive section 5 by codifying an updated coverage formula to assign preclearance
requirements. John Bowden, Dems Introduce Bills to Restore Voting Rights Act Provision,
HILL (Feb. 26, 2019), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/431693-democrats-introduce-billto-strengthen-voting-rights-act [https://perma.cc/84JU-S72H].
61. Kathay Feng, Keith Aoki & Bryan Ikegmai, Voting Matters: AIPAs, Latinas/os and
Post-2000 Redistricting in California, 81 OR. L. REV. 849, 864 (2002). Recently, however,
section 2 has been subject to attack on both enforcement and constitutionality grounds. See
Ala. State Conference of the NAACP v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647, 659 (11th Cir. 2020) (Branch,
J., dissenting) (contending that the VRA does not abrogate state sovereign immunity, meaning
individuals have no right to sue states for section 2 violations); see also Stern, supra note 60
(identifying arguments that section 2’s “results test,” see infra note 78 and accompanying text,
is unconstitutional because it exceeds the Fifteenth Amendment’s scope, which only bars
intentional discrimination).
62. The VRA also prohibits discriminatory voting practices by the federal government
and local governments. See Paige A. Epstein, Addressing Minority Vote Dilution Through
State Voting Rights Acts 3 (Univ. Chi. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 474,
2014),
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1918&context=
public_law_and_legal_theory [https://perma.cc/KJM6-QV28].
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018)).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(2) (1976) (current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(f)(2) (2018)).
65. 52 U.S.C. § 10310(c)(3) (2018).
66. Id. § 10301(b). The full, current version of section 2 reads as follows:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 4(f)(2), as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have
less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members
of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision
is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
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B. Burdens of Proof Under the VRA and Constitution
Originally, claims brought under the VRA only needed to allege that the
challenged voting practice resulted in a discriminatory effect.67 However,
the Supreme Court’s 1980 ruling in Mobile v. Bolden68 called for a
heightened standard of discriminatory intent.69 The Court, relying on
Washington v. Davis70 and its progeny, applied the “purposeful
discrimination” standard that is required to bring a claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth
Amendment.71 The Court has long required that equal protection claims
show discriminatory purpose.72 This standard has previously been applied
in the context of equal protection vote dilution claims.73 Similarly, “racially
discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth
Amendment violation.”74 This has produced a line of conflicting Supreme
Court decisions on Fifteenth Amendment claims75 of allegedly racially
motivated gerrymandering.76
In response to Bolden, Congress amended the VRA again in 1982 to make
it clear that a section 2 claim “could be proved by showing discriminatory
effect alone.”77 Congress created what is now the current section 2
framework—a “results test” asking whether, as a result of the challenged
practice, members of the protected class have comparatively less opportunity

section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.
Id. § 10301(a)–(b).
67. See Strange, supra note 6, at 100.
68. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
69. Id. at 66 (“A plaintiff must prove that the disputed plan was ‘conceived or operated as
[a] purposeful devic[e] to further racial . . . discrimination.’” (quoting Whitcomb v. Chavis,
403 U.S. 124, 149–50 (1971))).
70. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
71. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 67 (“The Court explicitly indicated in [Davis] that this principle
applies to claims of racial discrimination affecting voting just as it does to other claims of
racial discrimination.”).
72. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265
(1977) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause.”); Davis, 426 U.S. at 240.
73. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (requiring a finding that the
legislature’s redistricting was motivated by racial considerations in order to sustain an equal
protection claim).
74. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 62.
75. Compare Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346–48 (1960) (identifying that a
possible Fifteenth Amendment claim was stated where plaintiffs’ alleged municipal boundary
redistricting was racially motivated gerrymandering), with Wright, 376 U.S. at 58 (denying a
Fifteenth Amendment claim of racial gerrymandering because plaintiffs failed to show
discriminatory intent of the legislature).
76. Gerrymandering is the “practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts,
often of highly irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the
opposition’s voting strength.” Gerrymandering, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
77. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 35 (1986); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1982)
(current version at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (2018)).
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to elect their representatives of choice.78 The Senate Judiciary Committee
report accompanying the 1982 amendments identified a noncomprehensive
list of factors to consider when courts conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis.79 Each factor is concerned with the practices or effects of the state’s
election and political processes.80
The Senate was explicit that intent is an inappropriate measure for
establishing a section 2 violation.81 First, intent standards ask the wrong
question.82 If a current practice “operates today to exclude blacks or
Hispanics from a fair chance to participate,” the past or present motives
behind the standard are “of the most limited relevance.”83 Second, Congress
also determined that an intent requirement would be unnecessarily divisive
because it requires an allegation of racism against the officials or community
implementing the voting procedure.84 Third, showing intent places an
“inordinately difficult burden” on plaintiffs to sustain a claim.85 The Bolden
Court advocated for an intent standard because it argued that section 2 and
78. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 35–36; see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973)
(using the test that Congress codified in the VRA’s 1982 amendment, which asks whether
members of the protected class “had less opportunity than did other[s] . . . to participate in the
political processes”).
79. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37–38; see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29 (1982).
80. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 28–29. The factors include the following:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political
subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register,
to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large
election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other
voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination
against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political
subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial
appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.
Id.
81. See id. at 36.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 36–37 (noting the unique difficulty of determining intent from lackluster
state or local legislative records of voting practices implemented decades earlier); see also
Joan F. Hartman, Racial Vote Dilution and Separation of Powers: An Exploration of the
Conflict Between the Judicial “Intent” and the Legislative “Results” Standards, 50 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 689, 741 (1982) (“The drafters articulated two distinct aims in amending
section 2: to forestall purposeful discrimination that might escape undetected under the
stringent intent test and to eliminate systems that perpetuate the effects of past
discrimination.”).
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the Fifteenth Amendment served congruent purposes.86 However, following
the expansion of the VRA’s provisions in the two decades following its
creation, it was no longer legislation coextensive with the Fifteenth
Amendment.87 Instead, the VRA became an “example of Congress’s power
to enact implementing legislation that goes beyond the direct prohibitions of
the Constitution itself.”88
C. Evolution of Vote Dilution Claims Under Section 2
Voter suppression is a process whereby a minority’s right of access to the
polls is completely barred.89 Dilution of the vote, however, occurs when the
strength of a group’s voting power is reduced such that the group’s ability to
elect its preferred candidate is diminished or eliminated.90 Unlike the oftenindividualized analysis of voter suppression, dilution requires courts to
consider the treatment of a group to determine whether an individual has
suffered harm.91 Vote dilution, as a legal doctrine, developed over time
through the courts but was codified by the VRA as a private cause of action.92
There are two strands of vote dilution used in practice: “cracking” and
“packing.”93 Cracking is redistricting in a way that disperses minority groups
among different voting districts so that no single district has enough minority
voters to impact an election.94 Packing is the alternative practice of crowding
86. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (“[T]he sparse legislative history of § 2
makes clear that it was intended to have an effect no different from that of the Fifteenth
Amendment itself.”).
87. See S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 39.
88. Id. at 39; see also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (finding
that “Congress may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate [the Fifteenth
Amendment], so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting are
appropriate”); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966) (“As against the
reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”).
89. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1993) (“[I]t soon became apparent that
guaranteeing equal access to the polls would not suffice to root out other racially
discriminatory voting practices. . . . ‘[T]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting
power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.’” (quoting Allen v. State Bd.
of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969))).
90. Id. at 641; see also Epstein, supra note 62, at 3.
91. Gerken, supra note 48, at 1667.
92. Id. at 1671. The VRA originally entitled only the attorney general to enforce the Act.
See Ala. State Conference of the NAACP v. Alabama, 949 F.3d 647, 652 (11th Cir. 2020).
However, the Supreme Court first recognized the implicit right of private citizens to enforce
the VRA in 1969. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 555 (1969) (“Analysis of
[section 5] in light of the major purpose of the Act indicates that [private citizens] may seek a
declaratory judgment that a new state enactment is governed by § 5.”). In 1975, Congress
amended the VRA to explicitly allow private citizens enforcement rights over the Act as a
whole. See 52 U.S.C. § 10302(a) (2018); see also Ala. State Conference of the NAACP, 949
F.3d at 652. Despite challenges by states under a sovereign immunity theory, the Fifth, Sixth,
and Eleventh Circuits have upheld Congress’s right to limit the states’ sovereign immunity by
granting a private cause of action against state violations of the VRA. See Ala. State
Conference of the NAACP, 949 F.3d at 652; OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614
(5th Cir. 2017); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 398 (6th Cir. 1999).
93. Feng, Aoki & Ikegmai, supra note 61, at 864.
94. Id.
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minority groups into a small handful of districts so that the overall reach of
the group’s legislative influence is weakened.95
After two decades of confusion about the requirements needed to sustain
a section 2 vote dilution claim, the Supreme Court provided some clarity in
its seminal 1985 case, Thornburg v. Gingles. In Gingles, Justice William
Brennan identified three factors (“Gingles factors”) that a plaintiff must
satisfy to successfully claim that a multimember96 voting district is in
violation of section 2.97 First, the minority group must demonstrate that it is
“sufficiently large and geographically compact” to represent the majority in
Otherwise, the
a hypothetical single-member voting district.98
“multimember form” of an election system cannot be blamed for the minority
group’s failure to elect candidates.99 Second, the minority group must show
that it is “politically cohesive.”100 Third, the minority group must establish
that the white majority “votes sufficiently as a bloc” to “defeat the minority’s
preferred candidate.”101 The second and third factors help determine whether
the degree of racially polarized voting is legally sufficient to sustain a section
2 claim.102 Finding racially polarized voting requires a fact-specific inquiry
into whether there is “a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter
and the way in which the voter votes.”103 There is no clear doctrinal test, but
sufficient polarization is stronger when a pattern of racial bloc voting can be
identified.104 Ultimately, failure to satisfy any one of the Gingles factors will
defeat a plaintiff’s section 2 claim.105
In 1993, the Supreme Court in Growe v. Emison106 extended the Gingles
factor analysis to claims brought against single-member voting districts.107
95. Id.
96. A multimember voting district is one in which two or more representatives are elected
to represent a single district. Daniel R. Ortiz, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for
Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 YALE L.J. 144, 145 n.8 (1982).
97. Thornberg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 49–51 (1986). This is in contrast to a singlemember voting district, where each voting district elects only one representative. Nixon v.
Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1384 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996).
98. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17 (“[T]he single-member district is generally the
appropriate standard against which to measure minority group potential to elect because it is
the smallest political unit from which representatives are elected.”).
99. Id. at 48 (“Multimember districts and at-large election schemes . . . are not per se
violative of minority voters’ rights.”).
100. Id. at 51.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 56 (“The purpose of inquiring into the existence of racially polarized voting
is twofold: to ascertain whether minority group members constitute a politically cohesive unit
and to determine whether whites vote sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority’s
preferred candidates.”); see also MATT BARRETO ET AL., REDISTRICTING: COALITION
DISTRICTS AND THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1, 3 (2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/
files/Coalition(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/7FUV-U9AG].
103. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (quoting the district court record).
104. Id. at 57.
105. Skinnell, supra note 23, at 368.
106. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
107. See generally id. Multimember voting districts are still those most scrutinized by
section 2 because they “submerge the votes of a minority in the majority.” See Taintor, supra
note 14, at 1775–76. However, single-member voting districts, like those in the fictional
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The Court determined that the logic behind the factors still applied.108 The
majority population and political cohesion requirements still work to
establish that the minority group has the potential to elect its preferred
candidate.109 The white majority bloc requirement still proves that the
minority vote is diluted when submerged in a “larger white voting
population.”110 A year later, in Johnson v. De Grandy,111 the Court added a
deferential fourth factor to the Gingles analysis in its holding that “the three
Gingles factors may not be isolated as sufficient, standing alone, to prove
dilution in every multimember [or single-member] district challenge.”112
The original three factors provided structure to section 2’s totality-of-thecircumstances requirement113 but “cannot be applied mechanically and
without regard to the nature of the claim.”114 Thus, the initial three factors
are a prerequisite but are not necessarily dispositive.115
The Supreme Court also determined in Chisom v. Roemer116 that section
2 protections under the VRA must be liberally construed.117 The Court
recognized that Congress’s purpose for passing the VRA was “rid[ding] the
country of racial discrimination in voting.”118 In doing so, Congress passed
a statute that was “enacted to protect voting rights that are not adequately
protected by the Constitution itself.”119 As a result, the Court concluded that
section 2 must be “interpreted in a manner that provides ‘the broadest
possible scope’ in combatting racial discrimination.”120 The Court
recognized the difficulties of this broad, fact-specific inquiry but determined
that such difficulties “cannot justify a judicially created limitation on the
coverage of the broadly worded statute, as enacted and amended by
Congress.”121
D. Response to Minority Aggregation Claims
In the aftermath of the Gingles framework, minority groups began
aggregating to satisfy, primarily, the first Gingles factor: the majority-

Marques County, “can achieve the same result if none of the districts provide actual electoral
opportunity to people of color [and language minorities].” See id. at 1776.
108. Emison, 507 U.S. at 40.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
112. Id. at 1012.
113. Id. at 1010.
114. Id. at 1007 (quoting Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993)).
115. Id. at 1012.
116. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
117. See id. at 403 (holding that state judicial elections fell within the scope of section 2 of
the VRA).
118. Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966)).
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969)).
121. Id.
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minority population requirement.122 A minority coalition group exists where
more than one ethnic or language minority (for example, Blacks and
Hispanics) combine to form a numerical majority of the eligible voting
population.123 Congress made no explicit reference to minority coalitions in
the text of the VRA, though Congress considered at least one
constitutional124 coalition case in drafting its subsequent amendments to
section 2.125 The Supreme Court has referenced coalition groups,126 though
it has never explicitly decided whether they can sustain a valid claim under
section 2.127
In Emison, the Court conducted its review of a ruling from the District of
Minnesota assuming, without explicitly holding, that the district court was
allowed to aggregate more than one distinct minority group.128 In making
this assumption, the Supreme Court determined that the presence of a
coalition group made “proof of minority political cohesion . . . all the more

122. See Skinnell, supra note 23, at 369; see also Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 149
(1993) (defining a majority-minority district as one “in which a majority of the [voting]
population is a member of a specific minority group”).
123. See Skinnell, supra note 23, at 363. These are different from “crossover” groups,
where a protected minority constitutes a numerical majority of the electorate only when
combined with members of the white majority who vote for the minority’s preferred candidate.
Epstein, supra note 62, at 5. The Supreme Court has explicitly refused to extend section 2
protections to crossover voting districts. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25–26 (2009)
(plurality opinion).
124. Both courts and scholars have recognized that, in contemplating whether the 1975
VRA amendments should include language minorities, the Senate also cited to at least one
section 2 minority coalition claim. See, e.g., Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1395 (6th
Cir. 1996) (Keith, J., dissenting) (“In its discussion of the history of discrimination . . . the
Senate cited at least one case in which African-Americans and Hispanics brought a joint claim
under the voting rights act.”); Skinnell, supra note 23, at 365 n.18 (identifying the case
referenced by the Senate as Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964)); see also Michaloski,
supra note 23, at 278 (“In [Wright], two minority groups brought a joint claim . . . [under]
Section 2 of the Act.”). Scholars have been wrong, nevertheless, to characterize Wright as a
section 2 claim; the plaintiffs, still a minority coalition, pleaded their claims solely as
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment violations. See Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53
(1964).
125. S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 27 (1975) (discussing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973),
where an at-large voting system in Texas was found to have unconstitutionally diluted the
votes of Hispanic and Black voters); Michaloski, supra note 23, at 279.
126. See, e.g., Strickland, 556 U.S. at 13 (identifying the difference between coalition
minority groups and crossover minority groups); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 41 (1993).
127. See Emison, 507 U.S. at 41 (stating that the Court was explicitly not deciding the
minority coalition question). Nonetheless, minority coalition claims of vote dilution are
permissible when brought as constitutional violations. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S.
755, 769–70 (1973) (finding that an election scheme diluted the votes of Blacks and Hispanics
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment); Wright, 376 U.S. at 57–58 (hearing claims of vote
dilution brought by Blacks and Puerto Ricans as both Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
claims); see also Michaloski, supra note 23, at 278 n.41.
128. Emison, 507 U.S. at 41.
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essential.”129 However, the Court was explicit that it would not decide the
validity of coalition claims under section 2 in this case.130
In two subsequent opinions, the Court again made reference to minority
coalitions.131 While the Court noted in Bartlett v. Strickland132 that
“[n]othing in § 2 grants special protection to a minority group’s right to form
political coalitions,” this dicta was in reference to a minority group’s attempt
to form a crossover district, not a coalition district.133 In Perry v. Perez,134
the Court suggested that requiring a state to create coalition districts in
compliance with section 5 of the VRA was beyond the scope of what the
statute requires.135 However, Perez should not conflate the mandated
creation of new coalition districts under section 5 with the legal protections
granted to existing coalition districts under section 2.136 Thus, neither
decision has squarely resolved the minority aggregation question.137
There are substantial legal and practical differences between crossover
claims and coalition claims.138 Both exist where a single minority group does
not constitute a numerical majority “but still could be described as exercising
functional control over the district’s electoral outcome.”139 However, unlike
minority coalitions, crossover groups exist where a minority group can
sustain a functional majority only when combined with white voters who
support the same candidates.140 The Supreme Court rejected crossover
claims in Strickland because section 2 “requires a showing that minorities
‘have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to’” participate
129. Id. (dismissing the section 2 claim for failure to establish political cohesion).
130. Id.; see also Note, The Ties That Bind: Coalitions and Governance Under Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2621, 2629 (2004) (“[Emison] thus illustrates the
Court’s ambiguous and cautious approval of a coalitional claim under section 2.”).
131. Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388, 398–99 (2012); Strickland, 556 U.S. at 13.
132. 556 U.S. 1 (2009).
133. Id. at 13–15 (stating explicitly that the Court was not addressing “coalition-district
claims in which two minority groups form a coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition’s
choice”); see also Weinberg, supra note 13, at 426.
134. 565 U.S. 388 (2012).
135. See id. at 398–99; see also Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133, 149 (D.D.C.
2012) (interpreting Perez to mean that section 5 does not require the formation of new
coalition districts, while also determining that section 5 protects preexisting coalition
districts). Back in 2003, the Supreme Court ruled in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)
that states creating a mixture of majority-minority voting districts and coalition voting
districts—rather than maximizing majority-minority districts—was not a retrogressive
violation of section 5. Id. at 483, 487 (“Section 5 leaves room for States to use . . . coalition
districts.”); see also Note, supra note 130, at 2630–32.
136. See Texas, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 149; see also Ho, supra note 23, at 429 (“This [statement
in Perez] could be based on the assumption that coalition claims are not cognizable under any
circumstances (which would be an unusual way to announce a new holding on a question that
only recently had been expressly reserved [in Strickland]).”). At least with regards to the
question of retrogression, the Supreme Court has been explicit that it will “refuse to equate a
§ 2 vote dilution inquiry with the § 5 . . . standard.” Georgia, 539 U.S. at 478–79 (rejecting
Georgia’s attempt to rely on section 2 precedent to establish its compliance under section 5).
137. See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 430.
138. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
139. Ho, supra note 23, at 428.
140. See id.
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in the political process.141 Allowing crossover groups to bring claims under
the VRA would require the Court to change or entirely eliminate the Gingles
framework that has driven vote dilution analysis since 1985.142 Conditioning
minority voting power on an alliance with white voters eliminates the
workability of the first Gingles factor—whether the minority group can
sustain a majority on its own.143 Additionally, regarding the third Gingles
factor, “[i]t is difficult to see how the majority-bloc-voting requirement could
be met in a district where, by definition, white voters join . . . to elect the
minority’s preferred candidate.”144 Ultimately, the Court refused to require
the white-minority cooperation that the VRA intended to foster
voluntarily.145
Given that the Supreme Court has, at least twice now, reserved judgment
on the minority coalition question, the circuit courts are split on whether
multiple minority groups may aggregate to sustain a claim under section 2.
II. MINORITY COALITIONS: A SPLIT IN THE FEDERAL CIRCUITS
For more than twenty years, circuit courts have grappled with plaintiffs
asserting VRA claims on behalf of minority coalitions. In that time, the
circuits have interpreted section 2’s applicability to aggregated minority
groups in three ways: explicit acceptance, assumed validity, and explicit or
anticipated rejection.146 In 1987, the Fifth Circuit, in League of United Latin
American Citizens, Council No. 4386 v. Midland Independent School
District147 (LULAC I), was the first to explicitly accept minority
aggregation.148 In 1996, the Sixth Circuit, in Nixon, was the first to explicitly
reject a coalition group’s right to pursue a section 2 claim.149 The Nixon
court openly rejected the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and acknowledged that it
had created a split among the circuits.150 In the time between, and following,
these decisions, several other circuits weighed in on the aggregation
question.151 Specifically, the Second and Ninth Circuits accepted review of
141. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 14 (2009) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)).
142. Id. at 16 (“Allowing crossover-district claims would require us to revise and
reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of our § 2
jurisprudence.”).
143. Id. at 15, 26 (“Only when a geographically compact group of minority voters could
form a majority in a single-member district has the first Gingles requirement been met.”).
144. Id. at 16.
145. Id. at 25–26.
146. See Skinnell, supra note 23, at 369–73.
147. 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1987), and
vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).
148. See generally id. It proceeded to do so at least four times. See, e.g., League of United
Latin Am. Citizens Council No. 4434 v. Clements (LULAC II), 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993);
Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988).
149. Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996).
150. Id. (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s findings while noting that it does “not take lightly
disagreement with the views of [its] sister circuits”).
151. Compare Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cty. v. Hardee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906
F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990) (permitting coalition groups), with Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421
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such claims without explicitly addressing the aggregation issue at all.152
Several other circuits have not ruled on the issue, while also expressing
concern about the concept.153 To date, neither the Supreme Court nor
Congress has provided any clarity regarding the fate of minority coalitions.
A. Explicit Acceptance of Minority Aggregation
Two circuit courts have explicitly determined that minority coalition
claims permissibly fall within the scope of section 2.154 In 1987, the Fifth
Circuit ruled in LULAC I that Blacks and Hispanics could aggregate to satisfy
the Gingles factors.155 The Fifth Circuit upheld this interpretation in 1988,
twice in 1989, and again in 1993.156 In this time period, the Eleventh Circuit
addressed the issue in its 1990 ruling in Concerned Citizens of Hardee
County v. Hardee County Board of Commissioners157 that two minority
groups may aggregate so long as they are politically cohesive.158
Additionally, Judge Damon J. Keith’s dissent in Nixon offers the most
comprehensive judicial analysis to date justifying minority aggregation.159
Some scholars have weighed in, arguing that permitting coalition claims
furthers the VRA’s purpose and makes sense in light of the developing
complexity of American diversity.160
1. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Precedents
In LULAC I, Blacks and Hispanics brought a united section 2 claim
alleging that an at-large voting scheme to elect a school board diluted their
votes.161 The Western District of Texas agreed and required that the structure
be divided into single-member voting districts.162 The ruling was appealed
and subsequently remanded with direction to consider the then newly
established Gingles factors.163 On remand, the district court again found that
(4th Cir. 2004) (implying rejection of minority aggregation), and Metts v. Murphy, 347 F.3d
346, 359 (1st Cir. 2003) (same), vacated on reh’g en banc, 363 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
152. See, e.g., Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 280
(2d Cir. 1994); Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. See infra Part II.C.2 (identifying federal courts of appeals that have indirectly
expressed skepticism of minority coalition claims).
154. Following a Second Circuit opinion in 2012, three federal circuits arguably have
explicitly accepted minority aggregation under the VRA. See infra notes 267–70 and
accompanying text.
155. LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1499–502 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th
Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).
156. See generally LULAC II, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993); Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448
(5th Cir. 1989); Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989); Campos v. City of
Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988).
157. 906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990).
158. See id. at 526.
159. See Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393 (Keith, J., dissenting).
160. See infra Part II.A.3.
161. See LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1495 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th
Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987).
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1496.
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both minority groups were subject to a history of “oppressive discrimination”
and that such discrimination impacted their right to vote and participate in
the electoral process.164 It determined this by considering the seven Senate
report factors identified by the Gingles Court as relevant to the totality-ofthe-circumstances review required under section 2.165 The Fifth Circuit
affirmed.166 In doing so, both the Fifth Circuit and Western District of Texas
were unconcerned that two different minority groups were implicated.167
To reach its decision, the Fifth Circuit applied the three prerequisite
Gingles factors.168 To satisfy the first factor—constituting a majority
population in a theoretical single-member district—the court accepted the
trial judge’s finding that “Blacks and Hispanics live predominately in a
geographically discrete area.”169 The court identified three voting precincts
that comprised over 90 percent of the district’s Black population and over 70
percent of the Hispanic population.170 One of these precincts had a
population that was roughly 45 percent Black and 25 percent Hispanic, for a
total minority population of roughly 70 percent.171 This “overwhelm[ing]”
minority presence was sufficient to establish “a geographically compact
group capable of carrying a district.”172 The court then separated the second
political cohesion factor into two subquestions: (1) whether each minority
group was individually cohesive and (2) whether the two groups were
cohesive together.173 Both questions were answered affirmatively.174 It
ultimately did not matter that “there [were] many cultural and ethnic
differences between the two groups” because the “prejudice of the majority
is not narrowly focused.”175 Instead, it mattered that both groups had an
undeniable history of discrimination by the white majority and common
goals stemming from that history.176 It was also critical that the plaintiffs
introduced the same statistical methods used in Gingles to show that school
board elections followed racial lines.177 Finally, the court briefly concluded

164. See id. (quoting League of United Am. Citizens, Council No. 4836 v. Midland Indep.
Sch. Dist., 648 F. Supp. 596, 600 (W.D. Tex. 1986)).
165. See id. at 1497–98; see also supra note 80 and accompanying text.
166. See LULAC I, 812 F.2d at 1496.
167. See id. at 1498 (“Although there are two minority groups in Midland, both have
suffered the same adverse social and economic effects Justice Brennan described in discussing
the black minority in Gingles.”).
168. See id. at 1499–502.
169. See id. at 1500.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 1500–02.
175. See id. at 1500.
176. See id. at 1500–01 (“The bringing of this lawsuit by Blacks and Hispanics is symbolic
of their realization that . . . they have common social, economic, and political interests which
converge and make them a cohesive political group.”).
177. See id. at 1501.

2712

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

that the third Gingles factor is satisfied if whites “will usually defeat a
minority candidate,” whether Black or Hispanic.178
The Fifth Circuit revisited the minority aggregation question a year later
in Campos. The Fifth Circuit upheld the Southern District of Texas’s finding
of vote dilution of “the politically cohesive combination of Blacks and
Mexican-Americans.”179 More succinctly stated than in its predecessor case,
the court found that “nothing in the law . . . prevents the plaintiffs from
identifying the protected aggrieved minority to include both Blacks and
Hispanics.”180 It supported this determination by looking to Congress’s
recognition of the prevalent discrimination of language minorities.181 The
court concluded that, if members of both minorities are concentrated
geographically so as to represent the majority of a single-member district,
they are eligible for the Gingles analysis.182 To establish dilution, a coalition
must prove that they “actually vote together” and, under the totality of the
circumstances, are impeded from electing candidates of their choice.183
While the Campos court engages in a Gingles analysis like that in LULAC
I, some key additions and deviations are notable. Regarding the first factor,
the court rejected the defendant’s argument that, because a significant
percentage of minorities lived outside the disputed district, the coalition
failed to establish geographical compactness.184 Judge Thomas M. Reavley
clarified that the presence of a majority of minorities outside the disputed
district was insignificant.185 What mattered was that the minorities within
the disputed district constituted a majority of that district.186 Regarding the
second factor, Judge Reavley recognized that the dual purpose of identifying
racially polarized voting in Gingles made it clear that “a minority group is
politically cohesive if it votes together.”187 The Fifth Circuit’s most notable
deviation from LULAC I was its finding that a showing of political cohesion
for each minority group individually was “too great [of,] if not impossible,”
a burden.188 Like in Gingles, the political cohesion of the coalition group as

178. See id. at 1502 (finding the third Gingles factor satisfied based on the relatively low
success of minority candidates in Midland, Texas).
179. See Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1241 (5th Cir. 1988). The court
ultimately vacated and remanded, finding that the city’s proposed remedial voting plan was
insufficient. Id.
180. See id. at 1244.
181. See id. (“Congress itself recognized ‘that voting discrimination against citizens of
language minorities is pervasive and national in scope.’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1))).
182. See id.
183. Id. The white bloc majority voting to defeat the coalition remained a necessary factor.
Id.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id.; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text. Judge Reavley was critical
of the Gingles plurality’s determination that the minority candidate’s race was unimportant.
See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245 (finding no clear error in the district court’s decision to focus
solely “on those [voting] races that had a minority member as a candidate”).
188. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245; see also Strange, supra note 6, at 129 n.219.
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a whole is sufficient.189 Finally, despite being decided six years before
Johnson v. De Grandy, Judge Reavley applied the “fourth factor” of the
Gingles analysis—an additional totality-of-the-circumstances review.190 In
doing so, he partly relied on the finding that “Blacks and Hispanics suffer the
lingering socio-economic effects of past official discrimination.”191
LULAC I and its progeny have clearly recognized minority aggregation as
a guarantee in the Fifth Circuit. In Overton v. City of Austin,192 the court
rejected a section 2 claim because Blacks and Mexican Americans could not
prove cohesiveness together, though doing so would have permitted their
claim to go forward.193 The Fifth Circuit reiterated in Brewer v. Ham194 that
“minority groups may be aggregated for the purposes of asserting a Section
2 violation” and remarked on the difficulties in proving political cohesion.195
In League of United American Citizens, Council No. 4434 v. Clements196
(LULAC II), the Fifth Circuit once again proclaimed that “[i]f blacks and
Hispanics vote cohesively, they are legally a single minority group” for the
purposes of a section 2 claim.197
The Eleventh Circuit also reached the same conclusion. In Concerned
Citizens of Hardee County, the Eleventh Circuit, citing LULAC I and
Campos, found that “[t]wo minority groups . . . may be a single section 2
minority if they can establish that they behave in a politically cohesive
manner.”198 The claim was brought by Black and Hispanic plaintiffs who
alleged that an at-large voting system “unlawfully dilute[ed] the [group’s]
combined voting strength.”199 The claim ultimately failed because “the class
offered little evidence that blacks and hispanics in [the district] worked
together” or “ever voted together.”200

189. Campos, 840 F.2d at 1245 (“Of course, if one part of the group cannot be expected to
vote with the other part, the combination is not cohesive.”).
190. See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1249–50 (“After making the initial Gingles’ factor
determination, the district court turned to the [Senate report] factors to determine whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, there was a § 2 voter dilution claim.”); see also Johnson
v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1012 (1994).
191. See Campos, 840 F.2d at 1249.
192. 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989).
193. See id. at 540.
194. 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1989).
195. Id. at 453 (referencing Overton to caution against reaching conclusions about “interminority cohesion absent a diligent inquiry into the political dynamics of the particular
community”).
196. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993).
197. Id. at 864 (“Nevertheless, we have treated the issue as a question of fact, allowing
aggregation of different minority groups where the evidence suggests that they are politically
cohesive, and we need not revisit this question here.”).
198. Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cty. v. Hardee Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524, 526
(11th Cir. 1990) (first citing Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988);
then citing LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1499–502 (5th Cir. 1987), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350
(5th Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987)).
199. Id. at 525.
200. Id. at 527.
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2. The Sixth Circuit Dissent in Nixon v. Kent County
Judge Keith’s dissent to the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Nixon provides a
comprehensive analysis in support of permitting minority aggregation under
the VRA.201 In Nixon, an en banc Sixth Circuit panel denied Black and
Hispanic plaintiffs the right to bring a unified vote dilution claim under
section 2.202 Judge Keith’s dissent, joined by four other judges,203 relied on
(1) statutory language, (2) legislative history, and (3) commonly accepted
practices to advocate for VRA protection of minority coalitions.204
First, Judge Keith identified the ambiguity in Congress’s use of the phrase
“class of citizens” in the VRA’s text.205 He rejected the majority’s argument
that the VRA’s failure to address coalition groups meant that Congress did
not intend to grant such groups section 2 protection.206 He stated instead
that, because the VRA is ambiguous in its applicability to minority coalitions,
the majority was required to follow the “mandates of statutory construction”
by looking to legislative history.207
Judge Keith then analyzed Congress’s purpose in passing and amending
the VRA following the Supreme Court’s example in Chisom.208 Here, as
with the issue presented in Chisom,209 neither the text nor the legislative
history “limits Section 2 protection to cases involving only one historically
disadvantaged ethnic group.”210 As a result, given the broadest-possiblereading requirement established by Chisom,211 a narrow reading that omits
coalition protection runs contrary to Congress’s purpose of broadening the
VRA’s scope.212 Both the 1975 and 1982 congressional amendments
explicitly intended to extend the VRA’s protections by, for example,
inserting the broad phrase “protected class” into section 2.213 Taken together
with the law’s plain language, Congress’s desire to expand the VRA’s reach
supports recognition of aggregated minority claims.214

201. See Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381, 1393–403 (6th Cir. 1996) (Keith, J.,
dissenting).
202. See id. at 1393 (majority opinion).
203. Id. at 1403–04 (Keith, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 1393–97. Judge Keith also argued, with the support of only two other dissenters,
that prohibiting minority aggregation under the VRA segregates solely on the basis of race.
Id. at 1399–400. He contended that such a reading of the law serves no compelling state
interest and is therefore constitutionally impermissible. Id.
205. Id. at 1394.
206. Id. at 1398.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 1398–99.
209. See id. at 1398; see also supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
210. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting).
211. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
212. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1398 (Keith, J., dissenting).
213. See id. at 1398–99 (recognizing that, if Congress intended to omit section 2 protection
for minority coalitions, it would have stated as much in the extensive legislative record
accompanying the 1982 amendments).
214. See id. at 1399.
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Finally, Judge Keith looked to accepted practices.215 He noted that every
other court to address an aggregation claim has “assumed they are
permissible where the Gingles prerequisites are satisfied.”216 He also relied
on support from the U.S. attorney general—“the officer entrusted to enforce
the Act.”217 The attorney general, in an amicus brief opposing certiorari in
Campos, asserted that, “if the political reality is that Hispanics and blacks
view themselves . . . as a single unit . . . then it is sensible to treat them as
one group under the Voting Rights Act.”218 Since the VRA’s enactment,
each attorney general had supported an expansive reading of the law.219 “In
light of the extensive role the Attorney General played in drafting the [VRA]
and explaining its operation to Congress,” Judge Keith argued that the
attorney general’s interpretation “provides compelling evidence” of how
Congress understood the law.220
3. Support in Scholarship
A handful of scholars have advocated on behalf of VRA protection for
minority coalitions.221 In addition to reinforcing arguments already asserted
by the circuit courts,222 scholars have also developed new rationales to
support aggregated claims. Some argue that requiring a protected class to
consist of just a single minority group furthers the discrimination that the
VRA sought to eradicate.223 This practice, they argue, “further separates,
classifies and labels minority groups” in a way that entrenches minority status
rather than promotes cross-sectional unity.224 Regardless, they argue that
racial or ethnic composition of the protected class misguides the analysis.225
The ultimate inquiry of section 2 is whether or not a minority group has less
opportunity to participate in the political process—this may be true of one or

215. See id. at 1396–97.
216. Id. at 1396 (looking specifically to Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuit precedents).
217. Id. at 1397.
218. Id. at 1397 (quoting Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae at
35–36, Nixon, 76 F.3d 1381 (No. 93-1456)).
219. Id.
220. Id. (“Thus, the Attorney General’s construction of the Act supports the finding that
Section 2 permits minority coalition claims.”).
221. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 23, at 426; Strange, supra note 6, at 128; Michaloski, supra
note 23, at 291
222. See, e.g., Ho, supra note 23, at 431 n.167 (supporting the argument in Judge Keith’s
Nixon dissent that the phrase “class of citizens” does not explicitly reject minority
aggregation); Michaloski, supra note 23, at 295 (accepting the “functional and holistic
approach” adopted in Campos and the Nixon dissent).
223. See Michaloski, supra note 23, at 292–93 (noting that this practice “furthers overbroad
stereotypes and prejudices about and against the minority groups instead of providing equality
in the political process”).
224. Id. at 292; see also Ho, supra note 23, at 434 (“[A] rule against coalition districts
would afford minority groups protection only when each group votes cohesively as an
independent group, and would thereby disincentivize the formation of cross-racial coalitions
that the VRA is supposed to encourage.”).
225. Michaloski, supra note 23, at 291.
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multiple cohesive minority groups that have experienced similar barriers to
voting.226
Scholars have also attacked the arbitrariness of a single-minority
requirement “given the increasingly complex ways in which Americans selfidentify by race and ethnicity.”227 If section 2 were to prohibit minority
aggregation, a multiracial or multilingual Hispanic community may be
unable to assert a claim.228 It would also bar a community of Asian
Americans who speak different languages.229 Scholars note that this makes
entirely uncertain the legal protections afforded to biracial or multiracial
individuals.230 Ultimately, any claim that internal unity is stronger in a single
minority group than it would be in a coalition group is unfounded.231
Minority coalition supporters remind critics that aggregation would not
allow misuse of the VRA for political gain because coalitions still must
satisfy the Gingles factors.232 The VRA makes no assumptions about the
cohesive political preferences or voting patterns of any minority group.233
Rick Strange234 went further and developed a test to address the concerns
that permitting coalition claims would dilute the VRA.235 This three-prong
test serves as a precondition to applying the Gingles framework.236 First,
Strange requires that the differing minority groups have similar
socioeconomic backgrounds.237 Second, the distinct minority groups must
have “similar attitudes” toward the challenged voting practice.238 And third,
226. Id. (“If two minority groups experience oppression at the hands of the majority, and
they are able to establish the same burden of proof as one minority group might, then . . .
[democracy] is best served by allowing them to form a coalition.”).
227. See Ho, supra note 23, at 432–33 (“Can there ever be members of a single group,
given the inherent arbitrariness of our racial and ethnic categories?”); see also Michaloski,
supra note 23, at 292.
228. See Ho, supra note 23, at 432.
229. See id. “Asian American” is a class explicitly protected under the VRA. See supra
note 65 and accompanying text.
230. See Ho, supra note 23, at 432; Michaloski, supra note 23, at 292 (“In fact, minority
groups often have multiple subgroups as a result of differing internal cultures and histories.”).
231. See Ho, supra note 23, at 433 (noting that groups of “‘Blacks,’ ‘Hispanics’ and
‘Asians’ . . . often consist of individuals with different linguistic, national origin, and cultural
backgrounds”).
232. See Michaloski, supra note 23, at 294 (disputing the conclusion in Nixon that coalition
suits would provide unfair political advantages).
233. See Ho, supra note 23, at 433 (citing S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 34 (1982)).
234. Justice Rick Strange was, until 2011, a justice of the Texas State Eleventh Court of
Appeals. See Bob Campbell, Strange Misses Texas Supreme Court Runoff, MIDLAND REP.TELEGRAM (Mar. 1, 2010), https://www.mrt.com/news/article/Strange-misses-TexasSupreme-Court-runoff-7479506.php [https://perma.cc/FQG8-96MS].
235. See Strange, supra note 6, at 129.
236. Id. Strange’s three-part test was inspired by a similar recommendation made to the
Fifth Circuit in LULAC I. Id. at 95.
237. Id. at 129–31 (“If the groups can show that they suffer from similar handicaps, such
as poor education, housing, and high unemployment, it is more reasonable to conclude that
they collectively suffer from discrimination which has adversely affected their right to vote.”);
see also Note, supra note 130, at 2639.
238. Strange, supra note 6, at 129, 131–37 (calling for a case-by-case determination of
whether the attitudes of the distinct minority groups are similar, though stating that they need
not be identical).
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the minority groups must have consistently voted for the same candidates.239
Satisfying this burden, Strange contends, “will lead to greater compliance
with congressional intent since a court will be assured that it is faced with a
cohesive political unit joined by a common disability of chronic bigotry.”240
Failure to satisfy the test would weed out any “political alliance[s] having
little or no connection to discrimination.”241
B. Assumed Validity of Minority Aggregation
Prior to 2012, two circuits implicitly accepted the right of minorities to
aggregate for a section 2 claim. First, the Ninth Circuit in Romero v. City of
Pomona,242 and again in Badillo v. City of Stockton,243 entertained a vote
dilution claim by Blacks and Hispanics without questioning their right to
aggregate. The Second Circuit followed suit several years later in Bridgeport
Coalition for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport.244 However, in
2012, the Second Circuit explicitly recognized the circuit split over coalition
claims and accepted their validity pursuant to its precedent.245
In Romero, Black and Hispanic voters alleged that an at-large voting
system for the city council diluted their ability to elect preferred
candidates.246 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Central District of
California’s findings that the minority coalition did not represent a majority
of eligible voters in any hypothetical voting district.247 It did not matter that
the coalition may have constituted a majority of the total population.248 As
other courts have recognized, “a section 2 claim will fail unless the plaintiff
can establish that the minority group constitutes an effective voting majority
in a single-member district.”249 In Romero, the plaintiffs could not establish
this.250 Though the analysis could have stopped there, given that all three
Gingles preconditions are required, the court went on to find that the group
was also not politically cohesive.251 While the claim was unsuccessful, the
court did not address the fact that the plaintiffs comprised a coalition of
multiple distinct minorities. It simply assumed that Blacks and Hispanics
could aggregate to bring a section 2 claim.252

239. Id. (noting that this showing would all but satisfy the first two Gingles factors).
240. Id. at 129.
241. Id.
242. 883 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989).
243. 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992).
244. 26 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 1994).
245. See Pope v. County of Albany, 687 F.3d 565, 572 n.5 (2d Cir. 2012).
246. Romero, 883 F.2d at 1420.
247. See id. at 1425–26.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 1426 (emphasis added).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 1426–27 (“The district court’s finding was based in part on the 1985 city council
primary elections, in which plaintiffs’ exit polls revealed that 60% of blacks voted against the
Hispanic candidate . . . and in favor of white candidates.”).
252. See generally id.
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Similarly, in Badillo, Blacks and Hispanics in California contested the
adoption of an at-large voting system.253 The Ninth Circuit recognized that
the contested voting system embodied “many electoral devices and practices
that have been readily identified as common means of diminishing minority
voting strength.”254 Regardless, the plaintiffs’ claim failed because there was
no requisite showing that Blacks and Hispanics were politically cohesive,
“either when combined or when considered separately.”255 It could not be
determined that the district court was clearly erroneous in making this factual
finding.256 Again, even though the claim was unsuccessful, the Ninth Circuit
implicitly accepted the minority coalition’s right to allege a single section 2
claim.257
In 1994, the Second Circuit accepted review of a successful vote dilution
claim brought by several activist groups on behalf of Black and Hispanic
citizens.258 In Bridgeport, the plaintiffs alleged that the racial configurations
of ten voting districts were adjusted in a way that diluted minority votes.259
Addressing the first Gingles factor, the court found that Blacks and Hispanics
constituted a substantial share of the area’s eligible voting population.260
This distribution made it possible to create two more minority-controlled
districts than had previously been recommended.261 The court then accepted
“both testimonial and statistical evidence that African Americans and
Hispanics . . . are politically cohesive” in a city plagued by “remarkably
racially polarized” voting.262 Regarding the third Gingles factor, the court
recognized ambiguity in the “mixed bag” of evidence regarding the presence
of white bloc voting.263 It resolved this ambiguity in favor of the plaintiffs
by citing undisputed evidence “that politically influential whites have
worked to” elect white candidates over Black candidates.264 Without
explicitly commenting on the applicability of section 2 to coalition claims,
253. See Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884, 886 (9th Cir. 1992).
254. Id. at 889–90 (including examples of electoral devices used to diminish minority
voting strength, such as the system’s at-large component, a majority vote requirement, and a
functional runoff election procedure).
255. Id. at 891.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 884.
258. See Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 272–
73 (2d Cir. 1994).
259. Id. at 272 (“The plan proposed . . . continued a division into ten districts but changed
the configurations so that one district would be populated by a majority of black citizens, one
would be composed of a majority of Latino citizens, two would contain a majority of black
and Latino citizens combined, and the remaining six districts would consist of a majority of
white voters.”).
260. See id. at 275.
261. See id. at 275–76.
262. Id. at 276. This, of course, satisfies the second Gingles factor. See supra note 102 and
accompanying text.
263. See Bridgeport Coal., 26 F.3d at 276.
264. Id. The court also applied the “fourth factor” of Gingles, looking at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the challenged voting practice. Id. In concluding that the district
court was not clearly erroneous, it recognized a “number of race-based controversies”
surrounding the municipality. Id. at 277.
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the court determined that the Gingles analysis “weigh[ed] substantially in
favor of [a] finding of vote dilution.”265
Almost two decades later, the Second Circuit changed its position on
minority aggregation from assumed validity to explicit acceptance. In Pope
v. County of Albany,266 the court dedicated a single footnote to addressing
the circuit split that had developed following the Sixth Circuit’s Nixon
decision.267 It clearly identified that “the Supreme Court has expressly
reserved decision on the issue” and has stated the theoretical requirements of
a coalition group in Emison.268 The Second Circuit then went on to recognize
that its own precedent, specifically Bridgeport, has accepted coalition
claims.269 It relied on this in Pope to affirm the Northern District of New
York’s finding that a minority coalition failed to satisfy the second and third
Gingles factors.270
C. Explicit Rejection of Minority Aggregation
Only one federal court of appeals has explicitly determined that minority
coalition claims are not permissible under section 2 of the VRA. In 1996,
the Sixth Circuit became the first to deny a multiracial coalition access to
section 2’s protections.271 In doing so, the court relied on the VRA’s text
and legislative history to narrowly interpret the law’s applicability.272 On
similar grounds, Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit delivered
a striking dissent to the Campos court, rejecting minority coalition
protections.273 Since that time, the First, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits have
all alluded to the minority aggregation issue. While each has either directly
or indirectly expressed concern, none has taken the step to affirmatively
reject coalition claims.274 Scholars have also addressed the issue, arguing
against a broad interpretation of section 2.275
1. The Sixth Circuit in Nixon v. Kent County
In Nixon, the Sixth Circuit looked to (1) the VRA’s text, (2) other
authorities, (3) expansive trends, and (4) policy considerations to address the

265. Id.
266. 687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012).
267. See id. at 572 n.5 (“The circuits are split as to whether different minority groups may
be aggregated to establish a Section 2 claim.”).
268. Id.; see also supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
269. See Pope, 687 F.3d at 572 n.5.
270. Id.
271. See generally Nixon v. Kent County, 76 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996).
272. See id. at 1386–92.
273. See generally Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
274. See, e.g., Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 431 (4th Cir. 2004); Metts v. Murphy, 347
F.3d 346, 359 (1st Cir. 2003), vacated on reh’g en banc, 363 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004); Frank v.
Forest County, 336 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2003).
275. See infra Part II.C.3.
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minority aggregation issue.276 Looking first to the text, Judge Richard F.
Suhrheinrich relied on the complete lack of reference to coalition groups in
the “clear, unambiguous language” of section 2.277 He reasoned that, if
Congress intended to extend protection to coalition groups, it would have
invoked protected “classes of citizens” instead of a protected “class of
citizens” identified under the Act.278 Given that the language of section 2
“reveals no word or phrase which reasonably supports combining separately
protected minorities,” statutory construction requires that this interpretation
be conclusive.279 Second, the court considered other authorities, primarily
legislative history and other circuit decisions.280 Since the VRA’s plain
meaning is clear, “resort to the legislative history is unnecessary and
improper.”281 The court then identified and criticized the other circuits on
their application of statutory interpretation, “which none of the
Judge
aforementioned courts acknowledged, let alone applied.”282
Suhrheinrich specifically rejected the “incomplete [and] incorrect analysis”
of the Campos court.283
Third, the court addressed the plaintiffs’ argument that the VRA’s “broad
remedial purposes” required an expansive interpretation of the law.284 The
Sixth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs’ reliance on this concept, derived
from Chisom, was misplaced.285 In Chisom, the Supreme Court extended the
VRA, following the 1982 amendments, to judicial elections because judicial
elections were specifically covered in prior versions of the Act.286 In Nixon,
by contrast, “it [was] undisputed that the [VRA] has never permitted coalition
suits by its terms.”287 The Sixth Circuit also rejected an argument that the
purposes of the 1975 and 1982 VRA amendments condoned “a broad and
boundless ‘trend’ to expand the Act to protect” minority coalitions.288
Finally, Judge Suhrheinrich considered four policy considerations to reject
minority aggregation under the VRA.289 First, he stated that Congress
identified a specific list of minorities protected under the law, which did not
include minority coalitions, based on congressional findings of

276. See Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1386–92. In Nixon, Blacks and Hispanics brought a class action
suit claiming vote dilution under section 2. Id. at 1383.
277. Id. at 1386.
278. Id. at 1386–87.
279. Id. at 1387.
280. Id. at 1387–88.
281. Id. at 1387. Even if it did consider legislative history, the court found that the
legislative record of neither the 1975 nor the 1982 amendments made any reference, explicit
or otherwise, to minority aggregation. Id.
282. Id. at 1388.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 1389.
285. Id.; see also supra notes 208–14 and accompanying text.
286. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991).
287. Nixon, 76 F.3d at 1389.
288. Id. at 1390.
289. Id. at 1390–92.
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discrimination.290 Second, the mechanics of allowing minority aggregation
would create an unsolvable “puzzle” for state legislatures that, “in good faith,
seek to draw district lines according to the [VRA’s] nebulous
requirements.”291 Third, Judge Suhrheinrich contended that permitting
coalition claims would require eliminating the first Gingles factor.292
Finally, permitting minority aggregation would run contrary to the law’s
purpose by providing “minority groups with a political advantage not . . .
authorized by the constitutional and statutory underpinnings of [the
VRA].”293
2. Rejection and Ambiguity in the Other Circuits
Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit consistently rejected the concept
of minority aggregation, delivering dissenting opinions in both LULAC I and
on a denial for rehearing in Campos.294 In his Campos dissent, he
characterized the majority’s interpretation of such a “uniquely important
statute” as “disturbing.”295 Where the majority determined that nothing in
the VRA prohibited minority coalitions, Judge Higginbotham noted that the
correct question is whether “Congress intended to protect those
coalitions.”296 He stated that no such intent can be deduced.297 Congress’s
decision to extend VRA protection to language minorities does not mean that
Congress intended to extend protection to a combination of different
individually protected groups.298 Judge Higginbotham went further to
challenge the notion “that a group composed of [different minorities] is itself
a protected minority.”299 Instead, such groups merely constitute political
290. Id. at 1390–91. Stated differently, “[s]imply because Congress has found that African
Americans [and Hispanics] have been discriminated against . . . there is no basis for presuming
such a finding regarding a group consisting of a mixture of both minorities.” Id. at 1391.
291. Id.
If district lines are drawn pursuant to a plan to enhance the political impact of
minorities separately, the plan faces potential challenge by a coalition of minorities
claiming that greater influence could have been achieved had the minorities been
“lumped” together. If, on the other hand, the lines are drawn to accommodate all
minorities together, the plan faces potential challenge by an individual minority
group on the ground that its influence could have been enhanced had it been treated
separately. In both situations, courts and legislatures would be forced to “choose”
between protected groups when drawing district lines.
Id.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1391–92 (“The Equal Protection Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment and the
Voting Rights Act are aimed only at ensuring equal political opportunity: that every person’s
chance to form a majority is the same, regardless of race or ethnic origin.”).
294. See generally Campos v. City of Baytown, 849 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1988)
(Higginbotham, J., dissenting); LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494, 1503 (5th Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham,
J., dissenting), reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th
Cir. 1987).
295. Campos, 849 F.2d at 944 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 945 (“A statutory claim cannot find its support in the absence of prohibitions.”).
297. See id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
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alliances with shared agendas.300 Protecting political alliances “stretch[es]
the concept of cohesiveness” and dilutes its effectiveness as a measure of
relation between discrimination and voting practices.301 At the very least, he
scolded the majority for not better investigating political cohesion, asking
whether each minority group in the coalition was individually cohesive.302
Unlike the circuits addressed thus far, the First Circuit has not yet rendered
a clear opinion on the minority aggregation question.303 Originally, the First
Circuit fell into the category of tacit acceptance by permitting review of a
coalition group claim, without raising issue with the fact that the plaintiffs
came from three distinct minority groups.304 This opinion, however, was
released several months before the Supreme Court issued its Gingles
decision.305 In 2003, the First Circuit again tacitly made reference to the idea
of minority aggregation but ultimately indicated an alternative
interpretation.306 In reference to the third Gingles factor, the First Circuit
found that “[w]hile the ‘protected class’ being discriminated against must be
constituted of a particular ‘race or color,’” the same was not required of the
majority voting bloc.307 In that case, however, the court was not facing a
minority aggregation claim. While this leaves unresolved the First Circuit’s
formal stance on coalitions, the court, post-Gingles, is likely to read section
2 narrowly and require claims be brought by single-minority groups.
Similarly, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have, without deciding,
expressed concerns about the implications of minority coalitions. In Hall v.
Virginia,308 the Fourth Circuit reviewed a claim brought by Black voters
alleging vote dilution.309 To satisfy the first Gingles factor, the plaintiffs
asserted that “blacks were sufficiently numerous to combine with white
voters” to elect their preferred candidates.310 While this presents a crossover
claim,311 the court’s analysis more broadly addressed general multiracial
coalition claims.312 Citing both Nixon and Judge Higginbotham’s Campos
dissent, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that “multiracial coalitions would
transform the [VRA]” from a source of minority protection to an advantage
for political coalitions.313 Ultimately, a redistricting plan that diminishes the
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See id.; see also supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
303. See Huot v. City of Lowell, 280 F. Supp. 3d 228, 235 (D. Mass. 2017) (“The First
Circuit has yet to address coalition claims directly.”).
304. See Latin Political Action Comm., Inc. v. City of Boston, 784 F.2d 409, 410, 414 (1st
Cir. 1986) (dismissing plaintiffs’ claim for failure to establish racial polarization); see also
Ho, supra note 23, at 429 n.152.
305. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 420 n.62.
306. See Metts v. Murphy, 347 F.3d 346, 359 (1st Cir. 2003), vacated on reh’g en banc,
363 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2004).
307. Id. (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
308. 385 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2004).
309. See id. at 424.
310. Id. at 425.
311. See supra notes 138–45 and accompanying text.
312. See Hall, 385 F.3d at 431.
313. Id.
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ability of a minority group “to form a political coalition with other racial or
ethnic groups, does not result in vote dilution ‘on account of race’ in violation
of Section 2.”314 The Seventh Circuit, in Frank v. Forest County,315
addressed an Indian tribe’s claim of vote dilution against a single-member
municipal voting district scheme.316 The claim relied on a multiracial group
consisting of tribe members and Blacks to satisfy Gingles’s first
requirement.317 In addressing the coalition argument, Judge Richard A.
Posner identified the circuit split and the Supreme Court’s decision to reserve
Without explicitly rejecting the viability of minority
judgment.318
aggregation, Judge Posner briefly acknowledged the “problematic character”
of such claims.319 He then went on to reject the claim for lack of evidence
of mutual interest in municipal county governance between the two
groups.320
3. Criticism in Scholarship
Many scholars have argued that the VRA should not allow protection for
minority coalition groups. Critics have echoed the reservations of courts,
arguing that a narrow interpretation of section 2’s text does not support
minority aggregation.321 Additionally, it is argued that legislative history
suggests Congress passed the VRA to protect specific minority groups based
on empirical evidence of past voting discrimination.322 The logic asserted is
that empirical evidence of voting discrimination against two minority groups,
individually, cannot infer voting discrimination between a combination of
those two groups.323 Had Congress sought to remedy the coalition issue, it
would have done so explicitly when it revisited the VRA for amendment in
2006.324 Absent that clarification, “the courts should not read into a statute
what is not there.”325
Another theory posed that broad protection under the VRA is unnecessary
when minorities may otherwise seek relief through the Constitution.326
Where section 2 would not apply, minority coalitions may still allege claims
of vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause and Fifteenth
Amendment.327 Unlike section 2 claims, constitutional claims would, of
course, require the coalition to prove an intent to discriminate.328 This, it is
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

Id.
336 F.3d 570 (7th Cir. 2003).
See id. at 571.
See id. at 575.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 575–76.
Geraci, supra note 23, at 392; Yang, supra note 13, at 715–16.
Yang, supra note 13, at 716–17.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 717.
Skinnell, supra note 23, at 403.
Id. at 403–04.
Id. at 404.
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argued, helps mitigate the fear that political coalitions may rely on section 2
to gain an unfair advantage in the political process.329 Courts may then
dismiss claims against so-called good faith jurisdictions that would otherwise
face the consequences of section 2’s strict liability results test.330 This
constitutional avenue allows courts to avoid complex statutory interpretation
questions that implicate principles of federalism.331
Several more critics have attempted to “read the tea leaves” and predict
how the Supreme Court is likely to address minority coalition claims.332 The
consensus is that the Supreme Court’s rejection of crossover claims in
Strickland strongly suggests that the Court will reject aggregation between
different minority groups as well.333 It is argued that the same issue of
protecting political alliances exists, regardless of whether aggregation is with
other minorities or whites.334 The Strickland Court, quoting De Grandy,
highlighted that “[m]inority voters are not immune from the obligation to
pull, haul, and trade to find common political ground.”335 Scholars look to
the Court’s argument that the VRA is not meant to give minorities “the most
potential, or the best potential, to elect a candidate by attracting crossover
voters.”336 Some scholars contend that this applies equally to the attraction
of coalition voters.337 It is argued that Strickland is instructive of the Court’s
future approach to minority aggregation because it “framed the issue as
whether a minority group that constitutes less than fifty percent can meet the
first Gingles precondition.”338 The Court’s answer was ultimately no.339
III. MINORITY GROUPS CAN AGGREGATE UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE VRA
There is no indication that section 2 minority coalition claims are going
away.340 As the diversity of the American voting population continues to
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 403–04 (recognizing that a broad interpretation of section 2 might be perceived
as an unconstitutional expansion of federal statutory power that tramples on state sovereignty).
332. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 429–30; Yang, supra note 13, at 717.
333. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 425, 429–31; Yang, supra note 13, at 718–19. Scholars
also rely on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Perez, which rejected the requirement of creating
coalition districts as a remedy under section 5 of the VRA. See Weinberg, supra note 13, at
425, 428–29; Yang, supra note 13, at 718; see also supra notes 135–36 and accompanying
text.
334. See Weinberg, supra note 13, at 427.
335. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 15 (2009) (plurality opinion) (quoting Johnson v.
De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994)); see also Weinberg, supra note 13, at 427.
336. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 427.
337. Id. at 425, 429–32; Yang, supra note 13, at 718.
338. Weinberg, supra note 13, at 431.
339. Id.
340. See, e.g., Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012); Huot v. City of Lowell, 280 F. Supp.
3d 228 (D. Mass. 2017) (permitting a minority coalition claim, while addressing the circuit
split and ambiguity of its own circuit’s precedent); Perez v. Abbott, 250 F. Supp. 3d 123 (W.D.
Tex. 2017) (permitting minority aggregation); Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 405
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (identifying the circuit split but relying on Emison to consider the cohesion
requirement of a Black-Hispanic coalition); Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood
Ass’n v. County of Albany, No. 03-CV-502 (NAM-DRH), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11386
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grow, determining the VRA’s correct interpretation becomes increasingly
important. This Part argues that the current circuit split should be resolved
in favor of permitting minority coalitions access to section 2 protections.
This resolution is consistent with the conclusions of the Second, Fifth, Ninth,
and Eleventh Circuits and remains faithful to the Supreme Court’s principles
of statutory interpretation. While such a conclusion may be sustained on the
VRA’s text alone, it is also supported by the intent of Congress demonstrated
through its legislative history. In addition, despite the qualms of critics, the
VRA is the appropriate avenue of relief for minority coalitions. The VRA
offers broad remedial protection that is inadequately safeguarded by the
Constitution alone. Unlike crossover claims, acceptance of minority
aggregation does not render the Gingles framework unworkable. In fact,
strict adherence to the Gingles framework polices against abuse of the VRA’s
protections.
A. Principles of Statutory Interpretation Support Coalition Protection
The Supreme Court has historically engaged in a process of practical
reasoning, relying on a hierarchy of sources to interpret statutes.341 This
analysis begins with a statute’s text, looking to the “specific words of the
statutory provision being interpreted.”342 Absent an explicit statutory
definition, the challenged words are typically given their “ordinary
meaning.”343 Ordinary meaning is best understood as “reliance on a common
sense understanding of textual words or phrases, without reference to
additional aids.”344 Ordinary meaning must be considered in both the
narrower context of the specific provision in which it is placed and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.345 It must not be interpreted in
isolation.346 Ordinary meaning and textual interpretation must also abide by
canons (or rules) of statutory construction. For example, adoption of a
(N.D.N.Y. July 7, 2003) (permitting coalition claims). While the Department of Justice under
President Trump has all but abandoned pursing voting rights litigation, private plaintiffs
continue to vigorously litigate claims under the VRA. Tierney Sneed, Trump’s DOJ Has Not
Filed a Single New Voting Rights Act Case, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Mar. 5, 2020),
https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/trumps-doj-has-not-filed-a-single-new-votingrights-act-case [https://perma.cc/488A-3UU6].
341. William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 353 n.123 (1990).
342. Id. at 354–55.
343. See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 553 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(“When Congress has not supplied a definition, we generally give a statutory term its ordinary
meaning.”); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. United States ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 401, 407 (2011).
Ordinary meaning can be derived from looking to dictionary definitions. See Yates, 574 U.S.
at 537.
344. Lawrence Baum & James J. Brudney, Two Roads Diverged: Statutory Interpretation
by the Circuit Courts and Supreme Court in the Same Cases, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 837
n.69 (2019).
345. See, e.g., Yates, 574 U.S. at 537 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
341 (1997)); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662 (2001); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129,
132 (1993).
346. See Yates, 574 U.S. at 537 (quoting Deal, 508 U.S. at 132).
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particular interpretation must be rejected if enforcement of that interpretation
would produce an absurd result.347 The canon against surplusage dictates
that the language of a statute should not be interpreted in a way that “renders
superfluous another portion of the same law.”348 Additionally, the last
antecedent rule presumes that “a limiting clause or phrase . . . should
ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately
follows.”349
If a clear textual meaning is deduced, this may justify an end to the analysis
or merely serve as a presumption that the textual meaning is correct.350 If
the analysis continues, the Court then typically looks to historical
considerations where legislative history is the most authoritative source.351
If Congress’s intent clearly supports the textual interpretation, that
interpretation is likely decisive.352 Absent clarity at that stage, the Court may
then look to more dynamic factors such as enforcement methods, current
values of fairness, and constitutional principles.353
Applying this framework to the VRA requires prudent courts to identify
that the statute’s ordinary meaning provides minority coalitions protection
under section 2. Any other interpretation is disingenuous to the text of
section 2, contradicts legislative intent, and is functionally unworkable.
1. What Is a “Class” of Citizens?
Section 2 of the VRA safeguards “members of a class of citizens protected
by subsection (a)” of the same provision.354 Subsection (a), of course,
identifies racial and language minorities as the beneficiaries of the VRA.355
Critics of minority aggregation argue that, had Congress intended to protect
coalition groups, it would have written “classes of citizens” into the statute
instead of a “class of citizens.”356 This criticism overstates the role of the
word “class” in section 2. Invoking the presumptive last antecedent rule
347. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 404 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (stating that it is the Supreme Court’s role to
enforce plain language according to its terms, unless the disposition required by the text is
absurd).
348. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 386 (2013) (quoting Mackey v. Lanier
Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)).
349. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003); see also Jama v. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 343 (2005); Joseph Kimble, The Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, the
Example in Barnhart, Why Both Are Weak, and How Textualism Postures, 16 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 5, 18 (2015) (noting that the last antecedent rule is almost always applied, even when
in conflict with other canons, if the modifying term or phrase comes at the end of a sentence).
350. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 341, at 355–56.
351. See id. at 356; see, e.g., Yates, 574 U.S. at 542 (looking to legislative history after
engaging in analysis of the text); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 452–53
(1989) (same).
352. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 341, at 357.
353. Id. at 359. See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)
(relying on constitutional principles where statutory text and legislative history were unclear).
354. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018).
355. See id. §§ 10301(a), 10303(f)(2).
356. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.

2020]

ARE TWO MINORITIES EQUAL TO ONE?

2727

requires courts to apply the limiting phrase “protected by subsection (a)” only
to the noun directly proceeding it, which is “citizens.”357 As a result, it is not
the singular class that must be composed of a racial or language minority
protected under subsection (a) but rather each citizen that makes up the class.
So long as one class is asserting a claim, and each citizen in that class is a
protected racial or language minority, the statutory requirements are met.
Were a court to mandate that all citizens from the class have the same
minority status, it would be wrongfully reading into the statute what is not
there.358
While the last antecedent rule is rebuttable,359 there is no structural or
contextual evidence in the “clear, unambiguous language”360 of section 2
calling for deviation from the rule. In fact, there is substantial evidence to
the contrary. Proper textual interpretation requires considering the disputed
language in the context of the entire provision.361 Section 2 in its entirety
addresses and is concerned with “citizens” and “members” of the electorate
who may be impacted by vote dilution, not the class itself.362 Subsection (a)
makes no reference to “class” at all.363 Any mention of a “protected class”
otherwise is actually referencing “members” of a protected class, with
individual members being the primary subjects.364
Courts may also use the rule against surplusage to reach the same
conclusion.365 Were the Supreme Court to accept the Nixon court’s
interpretation, it would render superfluous any reference to “members” or
“citizens” in section 2.366 Had Congress intended the narrower Nixon
interpretation, it would have simply identified a “class protected by
subsection (a).” Had Congress intended the Nixon interpretation while still
making clear that section 2 is available to individual citizens, it could have
identified “members of a class protected by subsection (a)” or even “citizens
of a class protected by subsection (a).” It chose none of these. Thus, there
is no basis to render portions of the broader provision meaningless in order
to achieve a narrower interpretation that is faithful to language Congress
chose not to enact.
Even if a court were to find that the limiting phrase applies to the word
“class,” the word’s ordinary meaning is not so restrictive as to reject the
possibility of a multiminority class. Merriam-Webster defines “class” as “a

357. See supra note 349 and accompanying text; see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S.
20, 26 (2003) (stating that the last antecedent rule is “quite sensible as a matter of grammar”).
358. See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
359. Lockhart v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 958, 965 (2016) (“This Court has long
acknowledged that structural or contextual evidence may ‘rebut the last antecedent
inference.’” (quoting Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 543 U.S. 335, 344 n.4 (2005))).
360. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 345–46 and accompanying text.
362. See 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (2018).
363. See id.
364. See id.
365. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
366. See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text.
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group sharing the same economic or social status.”367 It has already been
determined that different distinct minority groups may, as a result of their
diversity, suffer similar or the same social and economic consequences.368
This conclusion is most poignant in the cases of citizens who identify as both
racial and language minorities. In these cases, rejection of coalition claims,
and thus rejection of the text’s ordinary meaning, would produce absurd
results. Such an interpretation of the law would require those individuals to
assume multiple social identities and prioritize one of those identities in
pursuit of securing voting rights. This not only further polarizes minority
groups but also becomes increasingly unworkable as diversity in America
grows more complex.369
Additionally, this interpretation blatantly contradicts the VRA given that
certain already-protected groups are capable of being coalition groups.
“Asian American,” for example, is a distinct grouping protected under the
VRA that could theoretically be composed of Chinese Americans, Japanese
Americans, and Indian Americans who speak different languages.370
Similarly, “American Indians,” or Native Americans, are protected under
section 2371—another group capable of being multilingual in a particular
voting district.372 Despite their coalitional nature, the VRA defines these
groups as permissible “classes.”373
While the Campos court ultimately misunderstood the question that must
be asked regarding the text of section 2, it reached the correct conclusion. It
is unimportant that nothing in the law’s text prohibits minority coalitions.374
What matters, instead, is whether the ordinary meaning of “members of a
class of citizens protected by subsection (a),” understood in the context of
section 2 and the VRA as a whole, permits citizens with different minority
statuses to form a single class under section 2. The statutory text and
applicable canons of construction suggest the answer is yes. At a minimum,
the answer is maybe and an examination of the VRA’s legislative history is
required.375

367. Class, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/class
[https://perma.cc/8ZAK-5JXR] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Class, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A group of people . . . that have common characteristics or
attributes.”).
368. See supra notes 176, 191 and accompanying text.
369. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
371. See id.
372. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. ET AL., A NEW CHAPTER FOR NATIVE AMERICAN LANGUAGES IN
THE UNITED STATES: A REPORT ON FEDERAL AGENCY COORDINATION AND SUPPORT 13 (2016),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ana/a_new_chapter_for_native_american_langua
ges_in_the_united.pdf [https://perma.cc/M5QD-AYPL] (noting that “current Native
American languages spoken in the United States range from 155 to 175” (footnote omitted)).
373. Consider also a multiracial Hispanic community. It is unclear whether the VRA,
under a narrow construction, would recognize this community as a language minority
protected under section 2 or a crossover district barred from bringing a claim.
374. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 207, 351 and accompanying text.
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2. Congress Intended for Broad Protection
The VRA’s legislative history “puts icing on a cake already frosted” by
supporting Congress’s intent for section 2 to have broad remedial powers.376
Judge Keith’s dissent in Nixon correctly identified that nothing in the
legislative history limits section 2’s protection to single-minority claims.377
On the contrary, Congress has instead repeatedly broadened the power of
section 2.378 The Nixon majority correctly noted that this fact does not permit
a “boundless” expansion of the law.379 However, Congress’s repeated
expansion of section 2 is instructive when addressing the minority coalition
question, which is, at least on its face, answered affirmatively by the VRA’s
text.
By expanding the VRA in 1975, Congress recognized that language
minorities have long been subject to forms of discrimination like those to
which racial minorities have been subject.380 The Senate Judiciary
Committee found, for example, that discrimination against Hispanics was
evident in “almost every facet of life,” paralleling the barriers faced by
Blacks.381 Going further, the Senate explicitly relied on precedent involving
a minority coalition claim between Hispanics and Blacks.382 It specifically
observed how at-large voting schemes in Texas denied both minority groups
access to electoral representation.383 At the very least, this indicates that
Congress was contemplating minority aggregation when it rewrote section 2.
Even in its 1982 adoption of the “results test,” Congress spoke of the rights
of racial and language minorities in tandem.384 The results test entitles
plaintiffs to relief if, under a totality of the circumstances, vote dilution is
effectuated as a result of minority status.385 Absent an explicit omission by
Congress, a coalition group bringing the claim should merely be one
circumstance considered in the totality. It is most striking that Congress
derived its results test from the Supreme Court’s analysis in the same
constitutional coalition case that it relied on in the 1975 amendments.386 This
indicates Congress’s awareness, and likely acceptance, of the right of
minorities to aggregate.
It is evident that, on several occasions, Congress embraced and relied on
the features of minority aggregation in its formulation of the modern version
of section 2. As a result, for those who care about it, the VRA’s legislative
history supports congressional intent to award protection to minority
376. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 557 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also
supra note 120 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
379. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
380. See S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 25 (1975).
381. Id. at 28–29; see also Michaloski, supra note 23, at 278 n.40.
382. See S. REP. NO. 94-295, at 27–28.
383. See id.
384. See supra notes 79–85 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
386. See Michaloski, supra note 23, at 279.
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coalitions.387 Given that legislative history conforms with the textual
interpretation forwarded by this Note, such an interpretation should be
decisive absent compelling evidence to the contrary.388
B. Section 2 of the VRA Is the Proper Avenue of Relief for Minority
Coalitions
Despite support found in the text and legislative history of section 2, critics
have continuously asserted that the VRA is not a proper avenue of relief for
minority coalitions.389 These criticisms are misguided. This Note identifies
and categorically rejects three prominent arguments offered in opposition to
the idea that section 2 may properly function as a remedy for a multiminority
class. First, the Constitution does not serve as an adequate alternative for
minority coalitions seeking redemption of their voting powers.390 Second,
permitting coalition claims would not render the well-established Gingles
framework unworkable.391 Third, adherence to the Gingles test sufficiently
prevents groups from using the VRA for unfair political advantage.392
1. The VRA Provides Broader Protection Than the Constitution
Broad protection under section 2 is not unnecessary simply because
minority coalitions may otherwise seek remedy under the Fourteenth or
Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.393 Support for a constitutional
alternative is premised on the idea that the burden of proof required for such
claims serves as a check on coalitions seeking unfair political advantage.394
This logic is misguided for two reasons. First, Congress has already
explicitly determined that section 2 is meant to confer protections beyond
those explicitly embedded in the Constitution and that the burden to show
discriminatory intent is inappropriate for vote dilution claims. Second, the
existing framework for analyzing vote dilution claims properly polices
against abuse.
As an initial matter, Congress has already clarified that intent is immaterial
in identifying a section 2 claim.395 The justifications for rejecting intent still
apply when minorities choose to aggregate. Intent standards continue to ask

387. At the very least, the legislative history does not contradict the textual interpretation
this Note forwards. In that case, a court would consider more dynamic factors such as
enforcement mechanisms and constitutional principles. See supra note 354 and accompanying
text. Both of these abstract considerations support minority coalition protection. See infra Part
III.B.
388. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
389. See supra Part II.C.3.
390. See supra notes 326–31 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 332–33 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 24–25, 232, 241, 293, 300–02, 313–14, 329 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
394. See supra notes 71–76, 328–29 and accompanying text; see also Chisom v. Roemer,
501 U.S. 380, 403–04 (1991) (“Congress amended the Act in 1982 in order to relieve plaintiffs
of the burden of proving discriminatory intent.”).
395. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
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the wrong question.396 If the challenged voting practice “operates today to
exclude Blacks [and] Hispanics from a fair chance to participate,” past or
present motives are still not relevant.397 Regardless of whether a class is
composed of one or more minorities, intent still requires an unnecessarily
divisive charge of racism against the entity responsible for the voting
system.398 Third, intent places an “inordinately difficult burden” on minority
coalitions, especially when satisfying the burdens derived from Gingles is
already more challenging for coalitions.399 These principles clarify why
constitutional avenues are not only too restrictive to carry vote dilution
claims but also distort the underlying principles of such claims.
The imposition of an intent requirement may have had more bite if the
VRA were merely a codification of the Constitution. However, the VRA is
no longer coextensive with the Fifteenth Amendment.400 Instead, it is
broader and prohibits what may otherwise be constitutionally permissible.401
This interpretation is reflected in Chisom, in which the Supreme Court
recognized that section 2 protects voting rights where the Constitution fails
to do so.402 It would thus be counterintuitive to reject coalition claims under
the VRA on the premise that the Constitution serves as an alternative source
of remedy.403 While interpreting section 2 to have “the broadest possible
scope” of protection should not equate to “boundless” protection,404 it at the
very least should include claims that are contemplated by narrower
constitutional provisions. It would otherwise be unfeasible to recognize
section 2 as a legitimate expansion of the Fifteenth Amendment,405 while
simultaneously barring under section 2 what is explicitly permissible under
the Fifteenth Amendment.
2. Coalition Claims Are Not Unworkable Under the Gingles Framework
The Supreme Court’s rejection of crossover claims is neither a predictor
nor a justification for rejecting coalition claims.406 Both have practical and
legal differences that make them incomparable in their applicability to
396. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
401. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. “Congress may, under the authority of § 2
of the Fifteenth Amendment, prohibit state action that, though in itself not violative of § 1,
perpetuates the effects of past discrimination.” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156,
176 (1980).
402. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
403. “Of course the private litigant could always bring suit under the Fifteenth Amendment.
But it was the inadequacy of just these suits for securing the right to vote that prompted
Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act.” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 556
n.21 (1969).
404. See supra notes 120, 288 and accompanying text.
405. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have “unanimously” affirmed the
constitutionality of section 2’s “results test.” Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990–91 (1996)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (collecting cases).
406. See supra notes 333–34 and accompanying text.
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section 2. While both are premised on the idea that a single minority group
cannot alone constitute a majority population, crossover claims rely on the
white majority.407 The Court rejected this framework because section 2
protects minorities, who have less opportunity than members of the white
majority to participate in the political process.408 Permitting crossover
claims would impose by law the majority-minority cooperation that the VRA
was passed to encourage.409 Permitting coalition claims would simply
impose by law the protection already promised to minorities who are unfairly
represented in the voting system. In addition, it functionally contradicts
section 2’s purpose to grant protection to a group that, in part, consists of the
very majority population that section 2 was enacted to protect against.
Simply stated, white voters are not a group protected by section 2. Permitting
coalition claims does not implicate this problematic contradiction because
each member of the coalition is a minority protected under the VRA.
Further, acceptance of crossover claims would force the Supreme Court to
abandon its long-relied-upon Gingles test as the two are not reconcilable.410
Coalition claims, by contrast, are workable under the Gingles framework.
The Court has interpreted the first Gingles factor as asking whether the
minority group constitutes the majority of a theoretical voting district.411
This means that the protected minority group is a populous majority in
relation to some nonprotected population responsible for diluting the
minority’s vote. Crossover claims confuse this criterion because crossover
groups intermingle the minority population with the nonprotected
population. Coalition groups avoid this confusion because each member of
the coalition is protected under the VRA. Regarding crossover claims and
the third Gingles factor, the Court failed to understand how white bloc voting
defeated minority candidates when white voters were “crossing over” to elect
minority candidates.412 Again, this issue is resolved in the coalition context
because the coalition is not relying on members of the white voting bloc
responsible for its failure.
3. The Gingles Framework Prevents Minority Coalitions from Abusing the
VRA
Courts and scholars alike have been adamant that granting protection to
minority coalitions will provide them a political advantage not intended by
the VRA.413 This position stems from the misguided assertion that a
coalition of multiple minorities does not constitute a single protected
minority group but rather an alliance premised on mutual political goals.414
Judge Keith, in his Nixon dissent, correctly identified that it simply makes
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.

See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 293, 300, 334–35 and accompanying text.
See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
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sense to consider multiple minorities as one group if that is the political
reality.415 It should not matter that the two minority groups have variations
in the history of their discrimination because the “prejudice of the majority
is not narrowly focused.”416 In the VRA context, it should only matter that
each protected minority group is equally subject to vote dilution under the
circumstances contemplated by Gingles. The presence of mutual political
goals among members of a coalition group does not negate the reality that
vote dilution is taking place. Mutual political interests are present in any
group seeking to elect a particular candidate, including in the single-minority
groups currently awarded protection under section 2.
Regardless, strict adherence to the Gingles framework otherwise prevents
ill-intended groups from pursuing political agendas under the guise of vote
dilution. While Strange recommended that additional preconditions were
needed to fully combat this danger,417 such a framework is redundant and
would render it nearly impossible to successfully sustain an already
challenging claim of vote dilution.418 The sufficiency of the Gingles test can
be quantified by the fact that, of the ten circuit court cases where minority
aggregation was explicitly or implicitly accepted, only three were successful
for the coalition plaintiffs.419
The Fifth Circuit’s approach is the closest to properly assessing minority
aggregation claims under the Gingles framework. Regarding the first factor,
the coalition group’s voting population must constitute the majority of a
hypothetical single-member voting district.420 A majority, as it is applied to
single-minority groups, must mean more than 50 percent of the hypothetical
district’s voting population.
Like the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Campos,421 but unlike its approach in
LULAC I,422 the second political cohesiveness factor should be assessed
against the coalition group as a whole, rather than against each individual
minority group and the whole coalition group. Requiring a showing of
415. See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
416. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 234–41 and accompanying text.
418. The only element of Strange’s test that diverged from the requirements of Gingles was
proof that the minority coalition shared a similar socioeconomic status. See Strange, supra
note 237 and accompanying text. However, relying on socioeconomic status “is a crude
measure and will exclude many potential coalitions that might otherwise have never
encountered the legal obstacle of inconsistent . . . interests.” See Note, supra note 130, at 2639.
419. Compare Bridgeport Coal. for Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271
(2d Cir. 1994) (holding for the minority coalition plaintiffs), and Campos v. City of Baytown,
840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988) (same), and LULAC I, 812 F.2d 1494 (5th Cir. 1987) (same),
reh’g granted, 818 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1987), and vacated, 829 F.2d 546 (5th Cir. 1987), with
Pope v. County of Albany, 687 F.3d 565 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting a minority coalition’s
claim), and LULAC II, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (same), and Badillo v. City of Stockton,
956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992) (same), and Concerned Citizens of Hardee Cty. v. Hardee Cty.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 906 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1990) (same), and Romero v. City of Pomona, 883
F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1989) (same), and Brewer v. Ham, 876 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1989) (same),
and Overton v. City of Austin, 871 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
420. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
421. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
422. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
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political cohesion at both stages places an “impossible”423 burden on the
coalition. It also fails to realize that a coalition group and single-minority
group are functionally the same if political cohesion across the group is
established.424 Further, political cohesion must be quantified by a concrete
metric, such as the statistical data of past voting patterns used in Gingles and
Campos.425
The third Gingles factor is also crucial in drawing a distinction between
racially polarized voting and attempted abuse of section 2. The presence of
a majority white voting bloc, like political cohesion, must persist over
time.426 The Supreme Court recognized how particularly important political
cohesion was in coalition claims;427 the same is true of white bloc voting.428
A consistent pattern of both factors will allow courts to clearly recognize
when systematic racially polarized voting has prevented a minority coalition
from electing its candidate of choice. The absence of this pattern may
indicate that either no dilution is occurring or that the coalition is asserting
its claim for improper purposes. In ambiguity, courts may of course still look
to the totality of the remaining circumstances to reach their conclusions.
CONCLUSION
Section 2 of the VRA sought to do what the Fifteenth Amendment alone
could not: protect minority populations from any voting system that has the
effect of diluting their votes. As the crown jewel of the civil rights
movement, the VRA was intended to provide minorities with the broadest
scope of protection possible. Whether those protections extend to minority
coalitions is a question that “cries out for clarification.”429 Denying minority
coalitions protection under section 2 would violate the statute’s text, ignore
Congress’s intent in passing it, and disappoint a class of citizens already too
familiar with discriminatory, unconstitutional barriers to voting. As the 2020
Census results come in and a wave of redistricting approaches, minority
groups in the most diverse corners of the United States have no guarantee
that their voting rights will be protected. The Supreme Court must address
this question and provide clarity to courts and state legislatures in their
interpretation of the VRA. Ultimately, protecting minority coalitions is
required to prevent an impending constitutional crisis at the polls.

423. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
424. Of course, when applying the “fourth” Gingles factor, a court can recognize the lack
of cohesiveness in one of the minority groups as a circumstance, in the totality, cutting against
a finding of vote dilution.
425. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
426. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
427. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
428. This recommendation is more stringent than the Campos court’s standard, which is
that white voters “will usually defeat” a minority candidate. See supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
429. See Perez v. Perry, No. SA-11-CV-788, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135830 (W.D. Tex.
Nov. 25, 2011) (Smith, J., dissenting), vacated, 565 U.S. 388 (2012).

